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Not a Cinematic Hair Out of Place
Examinations of Identity (Transformation)
as Evidenced through Haircuts in

The Crying Game
by
Allen Herring III

Abstract
This thesis asks a question: Can transformations to a cinematic
character’s hair be indicative of a realignment or shifting of
that character’s identity? As an attempt to answer this
question, I introduce three new concepts: the Opaque
Movement (OM), the Transparent Violent Moment (TVM),
and the Transparent Moderate Moment (TMM). All of these
concepts revolve around the treatment and appearance of a
character’s hair within a film. In this examination, I establish a
theoretical foundation for cinematic haircutting and apply the
three concepts to several films. I ground the discussion in a
thorough examination of The Crying Game by Neil Jordan.
The 1992 film contains four haircuts or hair transformations
and through analysis of the central characters before and after
their haircuts, I utilize the concepts above. This thesis
illustrates that in cinema, not a cinematic hair is out of place, a
choice in hairstyle, haircut or hair transformation isn’t merely,
or just, an example of fashion or cultural trend. In film, hair is
a marker of cinematic, cultural and identity formation.
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Preface
I have combination hair: see, parts of my hair are kinky, parts are curly, parts are wavy, parts are
brown, parts are gray, parts are straight, and parts are not so straight. I use various shampoos and
conditioners to tame, condition, control, stabilize, or manipulate the hair; however, despite the
amount and type of product I use, there are always several strands that refuse to bend to my will;
they continue to present themselves in their own manner. A fascination for my own hair and my
desire to seek its like sparked an interest in identity realignment or shifting as seen through
changes to cinematic hair. With that in mind, the examination of this topic took root many, many
years before I became conscious of my body or my identity in this world. As a young man, I
would sit in front of the television or movie screen or stand in the check-out line of the
supermarket and unconsciously digest the media presented to me. Slowly, I began to see less and
less of my self in these media and started to wonder where it was that I belonged. It wasn’t simply
a secondary status or a lack of positive images in the media that I began to notice. Rather, it was a
veritable lack of ethnic representation that I faced; and in many instances, continue to face
altogether. Perhaps it was because I was positioned on the outside as an Other – a body on the
margins of accepted society and thought – that I began to notice some cracks in the representation
of the self in media. It wasn’t until much later, as I began to cultivate a critical eye, that I was
afforded some language to articulate my perceptions. Despite this language, a conscious effort on
my part has to be engaged to sidestep the pitfalls of media identification. It was with this attitude,
as a germinating seed, in the crevices of my grey matter that my thesis concerning identity
positioning and creation as seen in haircuts or transformations to a cinematic image was birthed.
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Not a Cinematic Hair Out of Place
Examinations of Identity (Transformation)
as Evidenced through Haircuts in

The Crying Game

...if you'll just like me.
The color of your hair.
Judy, please. It can't matter to you.
If I let you change me, will that do it?
If I do what you tell me...
...will you love me?
Yes.
- Yes. - All right.
All right, then, I'll do it. I don't care anymore about me.
from Vertigo (1958)
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You should really do something about your hair
Introduction

Playing against type in the 1958 Hitchcock thriller Vertigo, Jimmy Stewart portrayed a desperate
man, confused and psychologically tormented in his search for a woman. Within this tale of
obsession lies a tale of identity— a story about seeing identity, finding identity, losing identity,
and transforming identity. Vertigo is a film about the fluidity of identity. At the center of this film
are four identities playing, searching, finding, losing, and becoming meaning all within the image
of one body: Kim Novak portrays Madeline, Judy, and Judy playing Madeline. The movement inbetween these identities is a process of psychological pain as the character of Scottie suffers
psychological torture as he wages psychological warfare against the various identities contained
within the image of Kim Novak. Integral to this movement between identities are the changing
hairstyles assigned to the various characters Novak portrays. From the upswept blond hairstyle of
Madeline, to the flowing red tresses of Judy, back to the blond up-do of Judy playing Madeline,
Novak’s hair serves as the identifying characteristic linking the identity of these distinct identities
to the body. The struggle to play, present and capture an identity that possesses a certain hairstyle
is central to the narrative and the motivations behind the actions and behaviors of the characters
in the film. In light of these transforming identities, I ask the question: Why is the appearance of
a given hairstyle, specifically, a haircut or a transformation to hair an important field of study?
In answer to this inquiry, it is clear that transformations to hair represent moments when
the identity position of a character shifts, or is realigned. As seen in Vertigo, the process of
becoming a given identity occurs subtly from the beginning of the narrative to the last scenes of
the film. However, the moments in-between these identity positions occur when the character’s
hairstyle changes from one style to the next. As the epigraph at the top of this thesis indicates,
hair matters in the struggle to produce or project the hairstyle needed to identify the character.
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The war in words between Judy and Scottie to make a change to her hair shows the aspects of
psychological warfare and torture. The desire to change, the desire to be wanted, the desire to
make, and the willingness to lose and surrender become apparent in this identity-making process.
While Scottie says, “It can’t matter to you” it matters to me and to the field of cinema and cultural
studies. Hair serves a purpose: it points to gender, it points to sex, it points to race, it points to
sexuality, it points to self. Hair isn’t merely, or just, an example of fashion or a cultural trend, it is
a marker of identity formation.
This thesis develops three new concepts dealing with how to read and analyze a haircut
or transformation to hair. Color, perm, tint, trims, shaving, and styling can be analyzed in film.i
The concepts I introduce include: the Opaque Movement (OM), the Transparent Violent
Moment (TVM) and the Transparent Moderate Moment (TMM). I will posit that the two
moments, TVM and TMM, can only occur within the Opaque Movement of the narrative, and
that all of the concepts revolve around the transformation of a character’s hair within a film. The
Opaque Movement finds it’s theoretical conception in the first part of my discussion – the
gendering, sexing, and consumption of hair. The Moments will be tied to the cutting of hair and
the ability to read the new identity position via the narrative or personal history (the inbetweeness of identity accessed via suture). The ability to analyze the Opaque Movement and to
distinguish between the two Moments will be examined throughout and worked through via a
discussion of pain, torture and warfare as described by Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain: The
Making and Unmaking of the World.ii

i

Throughout this thesis, I will use the terms haircut or hair transformation interchangeably.
In her work, The Body In Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, Scarry gives voice to the inexpressibility of
pain. As she explores how pain eludes and deconstructs language she states, “[pain,] its resistance to language is not
simply one of its incidental or accidental attributes but is essential to what it is” (6). At the heart of her theoretical
postulation, Scarry is moving beyond the exploration of pain and is concerned with the nature of creation and how
through creation man has produced its own decreation. For Scarry, the ultimate decreation of creation is the creation of
nuclear war. Couching her exploration of creation/decreation through an examination of pain and its “shattering of
language,” Scarry explores the nature and inexpressibility of pain by examining the topic via those “who speak on
behalf of those who are [in pain]”: medical texts and contexts, “the publications of Amnesty International,” the
courtroom, and the “fifth and final source is art” (7-10). It is through art – film – that I hope to expand upon Scarry’s
theoretical conception and extend her examinations of physical war and torture to psychological war and torture
between characters within a film as evidenced by a transformation to a character’s hair. Given that I argue a haircut or
ii
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To ground this discussion I will be focusing on the 1992 film The Crying Game by Neil
Jordan. The story centers on an IRA volunteer and black British soldier who forge a friendship
while the soldier is being held hostage. After the death of the black soldier, the film turns into a
love story between the volunteer and the soldier’s “wife”iii who lives in England. After two
characters, both presumed dead in the first half the film, re-emerge in London, the film turns yet
again into an action film. Within this film there are four hair transformations. The analysis of
these hair transformations and the subsequent realignments and shifting of identity positions help
to explore the Transparent Moderate Moment, the Transparent Violent Moment, and their
occurrence within the Opaque Movement. The characters that will be examined include Jody, the
black British soldier; Fergus, the white IRA volunteer and presumed hero of the film; Jude, the
white IRA volunteer who ‘traps’ Jody; and Dil, Jody’s ‘wife’ in England.
Jody does not get a haircut in the film, however his presence in the narrative is a powerful
ghostly image that haunts the second half of the film and serves as the power and motivation
behind several of the haircuts. The characters that experience direct transformations to their hair
and shifting of their identity positions include Fergus, Jude and Dil. Issues of race, gender and
sexuality are central to the identity shifts of these characters. During my research I have found
that issues of gender, sex, race, and sexuality are the most predominate themes involved in the
shifting of identity positions for film characters; however, issues such as class, sophistication,
acceptance, beauty, masculinity, femininity, and sameness are also present.iv
To develop the concepts above, I begin with a discussion of the racial distinctions and
cultural perceptions towards hair before introducing a theoretical approach to cinematic
haircutting outlined in this Introduction. In Chapter 1, Setting the Rollers in Cinematic Hair, I
enrich the theoretical conceptualization as I move through an argument on how hair is gendered,
hair transformation produces a realignment in the character’s identity, a spectator’s acceptance or resistance to the new
character identity will also reflect a psychological example of war and torture depending upon the spectator’s ability –
consent – to accept or deny the new character position.
iii
For a discussion of the Soldier’s Wife, see Jane Giles The Crying Game. British Film Institute. BFI Publishing.
London. 1997.
iv
e.g. Pretty Women, Little Mermaid, Fight Club, Taxi Driver, Clueless, Bringing Down the House.
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sexed, and sexualized by extension. I then use these discussions about hair to serve as a
foundation for how spectators identify with a character through the visual consumption of images.
Through visual consumption, I argue that images are posited into the consciousness of the
spectator and aid in the positioning of the spectator against the image on the screen and inform
the spectator’s view of the character’s identity before and after a transformation. I then talk about
how the cutting of hair in film presents a moment in the film when the identity of the character is
ruptured, changed, transformed, realigned, or shifted into a new position. I then propose that this
new position will be read by the spectator based upon how and which images they have
consumed. To understand the new identity position of the character, the spectator will first look at
the visual history of the film for a referent; if there is no referent available, the spectator will enter
the secondary source of imagery – personal history. This personal history is accessed through
suture and resides in-between the spectator’s position and the narrative. Throughout, I argue that
the cutting of, or transformation to, hair in film shifts the character from one identity position to
another. This movement from identity positions is the heart of my thesis: a transformation to a
character’s hair is indicative of realignment or shifting of the character’s identity.

Racial Distinctions and Cultural Perceptions towards Hair
In his work Welcome to the Jungle, Kobena Mercer argues “hair is never a straightforward
biological fact, because it is almost always groomed, prepared, cut, concealed and generally
worked upon by human hands. Such practices socialize hair, making it the medium of significant
statements about self and society. And the code of value that bonds them, or does not. In this way
hair is merely a raw material, constantly processed by cultural practices which thus invest it with
meaning and value” (100-101). In this way what is meant then by good hair versus bad hair? Is it
textural quality? Is it the ability for hair to flow through space and fall into place? Is it the color?
Or is it simply the perception that one’s ability to run your fingers through the hair constitutes
freedom and beauty? Or is it more naïve of me to say I want good hair in the hopes that I would,
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in the words of Tracey Moore, a graduate student in California, ‘get up and see that I had straight
black hair that fell easily into place without pulling and brushing’ (Byrd and Tharps 154). And if
Moore is correct, then what are the racial implications of good or bad hair?
Mercer argues that skin is the determining factor for race identification and thus, in The
Crying Game, as two of the main characters are black or ethnic, it may be the determining factor
for assuming the sexual and racial similarity between Jody and Dil. As such, for spectators, the
link in racial and sexual similarity is achieved in one telltale scene in the film: the revealv;
however I think the link between the two characters is made on the difference between their hair
and that of the other characters. The difference between the characters of Jody and Dil from the
other characters is tied to subjective standards of beauty that are associated with the hair type of a
given people. To start, let me begin with a racist generalization about the similarity of pubic hair
that is often consciously or unconsciously linked with hair of black people. This linkage is often
found in the choice of words that are used to describe the different types of hair. The words often
used to describe black people’s hair are coarse, bushy, kinky, woolly, and wiry, and these are the
same terms used to describe pubic hair. The interplay of these words evokes the image of both
types of hair on the body of the black individual even though they are completely different
biologically.

v

Jane Giles articulates how the importance of the reveal was integral to the marketing of the film. She states “Today
warned that ‘anyone who divulges the second plot twist of this handsome, terrifically acted movie deserves to share the
fate of Game’s most loathsome character’ (Giles 48) [and from The Orange County Register] ‘Just when you think you
know where The Crying Game is going, it delights you by going someplace else…This movie is about overturning
preconceptions – about people and movies.’” (Giles 48) The press embargo to prevent the reveal of Dil’s preconceived
gender directly points to a film about the public conceptions of identity and identity markers. By warning and
threatening spectators with death, the press operates as a torturer, forcing the spectator to accept preconceived notions
and beliefs of identity as shared, agreed upon, internalized, and consumed as a given natural order. The threat
(embargo) reinforces the importance of the reveal as something shocking, something abhorrent, something unnatural,
something that must be feared. To cause fear in a spectator is to inflict them with an acute psychological pain that ‘is
elicited by, rather than eliminated by, its object.” (Scarry 356) It is important to acknowledge that the object in
question is the penis and its presence on a woman. As will be clear, the ‘fear-and-object’ (Scarry 356) and the pain it
causes Fergus and the spectator will be eliminated not only through the narrative act of cutting Dil’s hair and ‘maning’
her gender, but by a spectatorial reference to an object external and internal to the narrative – the penis in absentia. For
critics like hooks, Edge, and Hill among others, there must be a conscious need to obtain a referent of a penis, and more
specifically a black man in possession of a penis (Jody – even though his penis is never seen only acknowledged) to
dispel the objectless fear that is produced in the psyche from seeing the cinematic image of a woman with a penis.
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According to forensic scientists Harding and Rogers, “pubic hair is generally coarser than
scalp hair and shows uniformity among the majority of individuals of the same racial group” (48).
These coarse “pubic hairs usually have a relatively wide, continuous medulla and this is
presumably why they tend to be stiff and wiry” they continue (Harding and Rogers 48). This
texture of pubic hair is more similar to underarm hair “in terms of their coarseness, medullation
and twisting about their axis” than it is to the head of any one individual of a certain racial group
(Harding and Rogers 49). Harding and Rogers state that the differences in racial hair profiles
show that “Mongoloid hair is essentially straight (and coarser because of its large diameter),
whereas Caucasian hairs are straight to wavy with a lot of variation, and Negroid hair is very
curly….that is, in addition to the wool-like crimp of the Negro hairs” (48). And therein lies the
crux of the situation: wool-like, coarse, and wiry. These racist terms have often been used within
the black community to describe “bad” hair, a perception of black hair that took root during
slavery in the early history of black America. Byrd and Tharps state “many White people went so
far as to insist that Blacks didn’t have real hair, preferring to classify it in a derogatory manner as
‘wool’” (14). While DeGruy Leary says, “White slave owners sought to pathologize African
features like dark skin and kinky hair to further demoralize the slaves, especially women” (Byrd
and Tharps 14). These ideas were transmitted to the public through various visual representations
that promoted the “long straight hair, with fine features” (Byrd and Tharps 14) as “good” hair and
beautiful while black hair is “given attributes…often referred to by descriptions such as ‘woolly,’
‘tough’ or, more to the point, just plain old ‘nigger hair’” (Mercer 101).
Such negative cultural perceptions towards hair can have significant implications
regarding the representation of black individuals in film. For example, in most films currently, the
predominant representation of black men is a short afro or bald. This depiction of close cropped
hair or baldness can serve as a double identifier for the spectator: 1) the black man shall possess
close cropped hair, his nappy hair in check and out of view, thus delimiting the appearance or
presence of his blackness. Spellers explains results from her qualitative examination of African
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American hair politics and remarks “that nappy Black hair is undervalued in American popular
culture to the extent that many Black [men/women] feel the need to fix, press, extend, or cover
their nappy hair because they have been convinced it is not naturally beautiful. In fact, nappy hair
is punctuated by what she calls the ‘kink factor,’ which represents a bodily discourse concerning
heritage and identity, but, perhaps most of all, if maintained and exposed, self-love” (Jackson II
52); and 2) a responsible man in society will have hair that is maintained close to the scalp in a
style that best fits his ethnomasculine social group. Tim Edwards explains in his study of fashion,
masculinity and culture that in “performing a productive role at the office, men were, and still are,
required simultaneously to consume the appropriate attire, namely the right style of suit and tie,
or to adopt certain lifestyles or take part in appropriate leisure activities, particularly in terms of
[masculine construction]” (Edwards 96-97). I would add to this argument, the man must sport an
‘appropriate’ hair style.
Who is to say though what is appropriate? What makes one style of hair more appropriate
than another? Why do we script our bodies in a manner that someone outside ourselves deems
appropriate to our social identity? In his study of the black male body in culture, Randall Jackson
II explains “the primary objective of scripture as a process within current popular cultural media
is to constitute the utopic American self in an effort to minimize the other, thus being consistent
with what it means to be a centralized, rather than a marginalized being” (55). Jackson feels “the
decision to make a change is a choice often deemed inappropriate because it does not comply
with their assigned corporeal inscription, which is predicated on the premise that all rules and
guidelines are to be defined by the dominant culture, and any violation of this agreement will be
viewed as an intended infraction and subsequently penalized” (55). Therefore, to get a haircut, an
individual must consider the implications of changing their hairstyle so as to not challenge the
cultural boundaries of appropriateness or acceptance, lest they find themselves outcast to the
margins of society.
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Fear of being penalized or cast out of culture could explain why currently long flowing
hair is often viewed on female members of society, while men are often viewed as more
responsible and masculine if their hair is kept short. Deviations from these styles trouble people
who want to classify and label the body with a specific nomenclature. For example, women who
choose to cut their hair short must be cautious of being named man, manish, lesbian, or sickly.
Although, to combat these connotations, Grant McCracken argues in his study of hair,
“women with short hair or a pixie-style cut can be also viewed as feminine without being fussy. It
lets a woman declare her sexuality without provoking the ‘woof’ response that sometimes greets
long blond hair” (150-151). Now with this in mind, it would appear that the image of woman
could be depicted with a short or possibly even bald head of hair. However several problems arise
from this. Films that depict women with this sassy, waifish short hair – Roman Holiday, Cabaret,
Sabrina – feminize the body with either makeup or clothing choice so as to not confuse the
spectator with an image of gender that might blur the lines into a sex that can be read as male or a
sexuality that reads lesbianism. Short hair, like going bald, is generally the domain of men, so
women who cross this boundary of gender identity must have their femininity expressed in other
ways. In the film Waiting to Exhale, the character Bernadette undergoes a radical transformation
when she cuts off all her hair and emerges with a pixie style. The old Bernadette is a repressed
housewife who has sacrificed her identity for that of her husband; the new Bernadette is sassy,
independent, carefree, and in pursuit of her own desires and sexuality. She still remains feminine
and does not enter the masculine realm of short hair. This is crucial because unlike some of their
white counterparts, black women are unable, as of yet, though there have been some notable
exceptions (models Roshumba and Alec Wek), to shave their heads and go completely bald.
Why? “Maybe guys think that touching a Black woman’s hair with a natural would be like
touching a man’s head,” Charline Cannon, a marketing manager in the California Bay Area who
keeps her hair in a short natural, theorizes (Byrd and Tharps 158).
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When Jill Nelson shaved off most of her hair in 1996, she wrote in her autobiography,
‘Most Black men’s eyes skip over me rapidly, distastefully, as if they do not care to see someone
who looks like me’ (Byrd and Tharps 158). Monisha Lincoln adds, “Although I love the easy care
and upkeep, I feel infinitely less sexy and womanly with short hair” (Byrd and Tharps 157).
Lincoln’s feelings of being less than sexual, less than feminine, is a common attitude shared by
many other woman and men who feel threatened by a woman who is saying with her bald head or
boy cut hairstyle: “Look, other women need their hair to make them beautiful. Not me”
(McCracken 176). McCracken continues to say that women who protest this attitude may say, “If
this is the way you feel about your femaleness, what are you saying about my femaleness? And
who are you to comment on how I see myself as a woman?” (177) While the logic for men on this
subject may be summed up with this: “Women wear hair to please us. If they cut off their hair, it
must be because they don’t want to please us, and this can only mean that they are gay”
(McCracken 178).
As I indicated before, women aren’t the only individuals subject to cultural constructions
of identity. Edwards says, “Images of masculinity are variously and, on occasions, contradictorily
interpreted, yet one factor which remains constant is the assertion that these representations
construct masculinity as part of a dynamic process of interpretation and implication” (Edwards
43). Edwards has indicated images of white, middle-class and heterosexual masculinity are
therefore hegemonic whilst those of black, working-class or homosexual masculinity are
subordinate. In addition, the hegemonic and subordinate are mutually reinforcing of each other.
Therefore, what we are often considering when looking at images or representations of
masculinity are not solely the overt images or representations themselves, but the complex and
covert conceptions of masculinity upon which they are premised. Edwards says, “more
importantly still, there is also the complex process of the interpretation of the viewer-viewee
relationship, and most perspectives upon representations of masculinity and men’s fashion
attempt to explore and develop this relationship” (44). With attitudes like this, images of gender,
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sexuality, and race are continually reinforced by the style of hair a character sports in a film. A
given hairstyle is not arbitrary; its visual depiction in a film is coded with a specific message that
delivers to the spectator a specific opinion and impression on gender, sex, sexuality, and race.
Take, for example, the red-headed bombshell of Gilda, Rita Hayworth. Early in her
career, Margarita Cansino starred in several Mexican films before being turned into the image of
American beauty and femininity – Rita Hayworth. William Anthony Nericcio states in his work,
Tex{t}-Mex: Seductive Hallucinations of the “Mexican” in America that it was “Rita’s offensivefor-some hairline…[that resulted in] her transformation into a more semiotically palatable
Hollywood commodity” (90). It was this desire to have good hair, that Rita’s hair and body were
transformed physically into the acceptable image of beauty. After all, as Nericcio argues so
rightfully, it isn’t “just hair, it [is] a studio asset, a valuable piece of property” (91-92). As shown,
the differences and perceptions towards hair and its link to race are tied to the perception and
differences in beauty. Therefore, in this especially, hair is foregrounded as an integral component
to the identity of the character. Each style, each color choice, each hair strand is meant to convey
an image and attitudes of femininity and masculinity in relation to the other. Like Rita Hayworth,
the hairstyles of Kim Novak in Vertigo and each character in The Crying Game are not arbitrary
in their construction or representation; hair is styled with an intended purpose to reflect culturally
defined identities and attitudes. This lack of arbitrariness is evident in all films, because in
cinema, image is everything; not even a cinematic hair is out of place.

A theory of the cinematic haircut
Given the importance of hair to studios and its ability to transmit attitudes regarding culture, to
depict a change in hairstyle within a film is not an arbitrary action. To show a haircut must mean
something is about to revealed or uncovered; it must represent a moment of importance in the
reading of culture and the formation of identity. The decision to show a character undergoing a
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hair transformation is purposeful and often results in a hairstyle that reinforces the boundaries of
identity that are advocated by culture at any given period in time. However, the haircut and the
resulting image can trouble, rupture and disrupt the culture in which it was produced. As I
indicated at the beginning of this chapter, I propose three concepts that can be used when reading
and interpreting a haircut in a movie: the Transparent Moderate Moment, the Transparent
Violent Moment, and their occurrence within the Opaque Movement. The following still
images from The Crying Game will serve as the centerpiece of the discussion for now; while the
clips are from a specific film they can be read as examples of still images from any film in which
a haircut is depicted.

Figure 1: Still Images from The Crying Game: a. Photograph of Jody in cricket whites, b. Still
image of dream-like (ghostly image) of Jody tossing a ball, c. Still image of Dil in crickets whites
(something new, something that nobody recognizes) running

To begin, what becomes apparent in the stills is a striking absence – an absence that should not be
mistaken for a lack of something, but rather should be read as a two-fold absence – body and
movement. In the first picture, we see a still of a photograph of a black man in cricket whites. In
the second picture, we see a still of black man in the same outfit. In the third picture, we see a still
of something that nobody recognizes in a similar outfit. Further, a noticeable difference between
the stills is the first picture is a still of a photograph from the film, while the last two pictures are
stills of characters in motion.
When examining the stills, an apparent difference between the first and second stills and
the third still image is the fit of the clothes. The body contained by and beneath the clothes does
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not occupy the same amount of space beneath the fabric. The absence of body mass distinctly
shows that the third still image cannot be mistaken for the first or second still image despite the
similarity in clothing. Ignoring this noticeable characteristic is to ignore the presence of a
different body beneath the clothes. One may ask, how is it ignoring it, they look alike? If that is
the assertion, what is it that makes the two similar? The skin tone is different and the manner in
which the body occupies the clothes is different. A possible similarity can be achieved however
through the hairstyle as both bodies sport a short natural afro. And yet even the style itself is
different, as the image of something that nobody recognizes has more curls, more flyaway
tendrils than the afro on the other body. It is as if through the hair, the image is attempting to
stretch itself beyond the body: possibly trying to reach a previous state in which the hair pushed
past the limits of the frame. If we are to concede that the two images are similar because of
hairstyle, the absence of body mass should become more apparent and negate their similarity as
the drape of the clothing indicates a body of demure or delicate stature.
As I indicated before, the absence is more than the material absence of the body mass as
evidenced by the ill-fitting clothes. The absence is also the lack of movement from all the images.
In all three instances the bodies of the characters are frozen. Of course, frozen is a relative term
here. In Still (a), frozen refers to a body posed, staged for a snapshot, a singular moment in time.
The posture, the gaze, the manner of the body in the photograph is positioned in a manner that
asks the viewer to “look at me sit for a moment and pose for this photograph.” This still recalls
the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe’s X Portfolio that David Marriot examines in his study
of incorporation of the image (photograph) through the eyes. Marriott argues in his work On
Black Men that the camera operates like the eye of the individual and bites the image
(photograph) for visual incorporation and consumption. Once incorporated the consumed image
becomes part of the person viewing the image. In agreement with Marriott on this point, I
contend that the movie camera operates like the eyes of the spectators and bites reality and allows
spectators to consume images of bodies in motion. Therefore, frozen for the other two still
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images is a pausing in the action, a single capture of a body in motion. The arm swing and the
head turn are but momentary pauses as if the body were frozen mid-action. The manner in which
the body is captured asks the viewer to “look at me in motion for the camera.” In motion, the
movement of the body within the clothes through the space on-screen is different. The absence of
the movement becomes apparent in a still image or a photograph; yet absence is forgotten,
displaced, rendered opaque within the medium of film as the spectator sees, consumes and
naturalizes the image of the body in motion.
Capturing movement, action by the bodies in motion, is inherent to cinema. Consuming
movement enables the spectator of cinema to imagine the reality of the images before them.
Image representations of bodies in motion reflect a possible reality. Identification with this
possible reality through the visual incorporation of bodies in motion (moving images) is a
significant characteristic of the Opaque Movement of cinema. As such, all films that contain
image representations of humans both static (e.g. a photograph, billboard, magazine cover, and
paintings to name a few) and in motion (e.g. characters participating within the narrative of the
film) are contained within the Opaque Movement. However, identification with an image on the
screen should not lead to a conclusion that identity for either the character or the spectator
viewing the film has been achieved. For as Homi Bhabha has indicated in his theorization of
identity in a post-colonial era, the process of identification, or more specifically, identity
formation is a combination of three factors: “First: to exist is to be called into being in relation to
an otherness, its look or locus….Second: the very place of identification, caught in the tension of
demand and desire, is a space of splitting….Finally, the question of identification is never the
affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy – it is always the production of
an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image.” (63-64).
Therefore, viewing the Opaque Movement of cinema can result in the identification with an
image on-screen, however identity is not inclusive of that identificatory process alone. For
identity to be approached, there must be a moment of calling into being, a production or creation,
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a transformation of the character, an assumption of the newly created image of identity, and all of
this will occur at a moment of splitting. In cinema, that moment of splitting is the haircut or hair
transformation. In her discussion of the disembodiment of hair, Janice Miller concurs with the
significance of a haircut when she states, “hair cutting is a moment of both physical and symbolic
alteration, becoming a temporal marker of a particular moment which ‘embodies materialized
time’.” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 185) Therefore, the haircut or hair transformation signifies the
moment in which the tension between demand and desire to call into being or the transformation
of the subject has occurred, or is occurring, within the Opaque Movement of film. Yet the
possibility of identity existing, forming, becoming, can only occur when the subject has been
transformed through a haircut or a transformation to their hair, and the production of that identity
as pre-given or self-fulfilled is assumed.
The affirmation process of a pre-given or self-fulfilled identity is directly tied to the
tension between the demand and the desire of the subject and/or a secondary character and/or the
willingness for the spectator to affirm and assume the identity of the image. At this point, tension,
demand, and desire take significant import in the discussion. Tension alludes to thoughts and
feelings of stretching, straining, suspense, intensity, elasticity, force, excitement, anxiety, and
pressure between individuals, groups, nations, or the self. Demand alludes to thoughts and
feelings of authority, force, requirements, wanting, urgency, desire, power, and summoning
between individuals, groups, nations, or the self. Desire alludes to thoughts and feelings of
wanting, asking, wishing, craving, requesting, thirsting, yearning, reaching, (un)worthiness,
wistfulness, and longing between individuals, groups, nations, or the self. All these allusions,
among many other words and concepts associated with these three initial terms, implicate a sense
of movement and emotional ambiguity. This emotional ambiguity escapes tangibility, and yet,
each of these allusions can be allayed in some manner by the introduction of some external object
that is causing the straining, stretching, wanting, urgency, wishing and yearning and so on.
Beyond the aforementioned terms and located within the language of “between individuals,
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groups, nations, or the self” are the ideas of struggle, confrontation, negotiation, wrestling,
beliefs, and imagining. Other terms located within the term “between” are ideas of warfare,
torture, and consent. In her work The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World,
Elaine Scarry theorizes the intangibility, inexpressibility and the language-destructive capacity of
pain. Why is the idea of pain important to this argument at this point? As can be evidenced in the
myriad use of terms above, the attributes “of pain” as described by Scarry are evoked when she
states that, “the deeply problematic character of this language, its inherent instability, arises
precisely because it permits a break in the identification of the referent and thus a
misidentification of the thing to which the attributes belong. While the advantage of the sign is its
proximity to the body, its disadvantage is the ease with which it can then be spatially separated
from the body” (17).
Within the Opaque Movement, identity can be assumed as given, though this given
assumption is based on the acceptance of historical preconceptions ascribed to the image. As
such, it is as if the words utilized for characterization (nomenclature such as black, white,
hispanic, asian, gay, straight, lesbian, transgender, queer, and transvestite among many others)
and the concepts of identity (race, gender, sex, sexuality, and body) overlap and co-exist as one.
In this case, language or nomenclature is advantageously linked or sutured to the body as if the
sign black man (word) means black man (body). Though Scarry is talking about language
associated with the concept of pain, it stands to reason that the character of nomenclature such as
black man is also unstable and thus can lead to a misidentification of the thing (body) that is
attributed with said nomenclature. For example, watching a film with bodies in motion, the
spectator bites and consumes representations through their eyes and incorporates images with
prescribed nomenclature such as black male, white female, straight woman, gay asian, or queer
lesbian and assumes that nomenclature belongs to the identity of the image. Spectators who may
or may not be aware of the process of identification with the image on the screen naturalize this
process of identification with cinematic images. However for identity to occur, a crisis, an event,
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a rupture, a moment (a place of splitting) must be introduced, or interrupt, the perceived natural
movement of the narrative (identification process). To reiterate, that moment is a point in the
narrative when a haircut or hair transformation occurs or becomes apparent to the spectator (and
other characters within the narrative). At the moment of a haircut or a transformation to hair, the
sign is spatially separated from the body: given the instability of language, misidentification of
the new image can occur if identification of the referent does not belong to the pre-given or selffulfilled identity that was created in the moment of the haircut or hair transformation.
The moments within the Opaque Movement at which point the identification of the
referent within the process of identification occur are called the Transparent Violent Moment
and the Transparent Moderate Moment. Within these moments, warfare and/or torture will
occur between individuals, groups, nations, or the self as the tension between demand and desire
to identify the sign and locate its proximity to the body arises. The context upon which to name
and to identify the image can only be obtained by consuming the image in motion throughout the
Opaque Movement; however, consumption of the image of the body in motion is but one aspect
of the identification process. As stated before, within the Opaque Movement, nomenclature and
concept are perceived as one, the sign is proximally located with the body. However upon the
occurrence of either the Transparent Violent Moment or the Transparent Moderate Moment,
which may occur in a brief or extended sequence on-screen, or off-screen, the movement of the
narrative is troubled, ruptured, and becomes apparent in both its stasis and fluidity.
Staying with the film stills from The Crying Game, words are required for the
identification process. In the film stills and the movie, words characterize the contents of the
frame – white sweater with green and yellow neckline, white pants, a shade of brown skin tone,
natural hair. Collectively, one could name the image – Jody in his cricket whites, Dil in Jody’s
cricket whites, or two colored individuals in their cricket whites. Yet how do those names
approach the identity of either image? When a film is viewed statically, as in the film stills,
absences become apparent. It is as if the negative space on the page between the images were the
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frames on a filmstrip: the negative space opening up the spatial distance in-between name (sign)
and image (body). During the course of the narrative, the Transparent Moderate Moment and the
Transparent Violent Moment operate like a moment of stasis when the spatial distance inbetween name, image and concept is exposed. Closing the gap in-between name, image and
concept is achieved only by locating a referent within the narrative. Locating a referent within the
narrative sutures the gaps between name, image and concept. Kaja Silverman adds a robust way
of understanding Marriott’s concept of incorporation and devoration with her theoretical concept
of suture that argues for a method of understanding how the subject or the individual emerges
within discourse. To combine Marriott, Bhabha, Miller, and Silverman within the Opaque
Movement, spectators visually consume, devour and incorporate within their consciousness a
catalogue of referents; at the moment of the haircut – TVM or TMM, the individual receiving a
haircut becomes the signifier of a new identity and the signified of a previous identity. Thus, the
individual post-haircut can signify a new identity that is either pre-given or self-fulfilled. Suture
allows the spectator to search the narrative for a referent, a signified character that will allow for
the gap in identification to close. As seen in the film stills, suture is obtained by naming or
identifying the images as Jody in cricket whites, Dil in Jody’s cricket whites, or for the traditional
critic/spectator of the film—black men in cricket whites. At the point of a haircut, locating a
referent produces discomfort on the part of the spectator. The pain that could be attributed to the
irritation produced by subconsciously needing to locate a referent within the narrative for likefor-like comparison can be either moderate or violent, at best. A component of the Transparent
Moderate Moment is a subconscious locating of a referent within the narrative that affirms the
prescribed nomenclature attributed to the body and reduces the possibility of misidentification
because the spatial distance between the sign and the body as a result of the haircut does not
challenge the preconceived notions of identification.
The deeply problematic character of this language just uttered should become apparent
quickly in that the locating of a referent within the narrative is also a component of the
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Transparent Violent Moment. A distinction that can delineate between the two (and once uttered
the deeply problematic character of this language should also become apparent) occurs when a
hair transformation or haircut results in an image whose referent cannot be located within the
narrative but must be identified apart from the film. The need to locate a referent apart from the
narrative increases the spatial distance between the sign and the body and thus a more significant
amount of pain is inflicted upon the spectator who must search their subconscious or
consciousness for a referent that sutures the gap and returns the name, image and concept into a
single image of identification. Given the common need to locate a referent within the narrative
post-haircut, a more apropos and cleaner component of the Transparent Violent Moment is that
the amount of hair being cut, or the type of transformation undergone, will be significant.
Specifically, long and/or medium-length hair will be cut short or shaved and/or hair will be
colored or dyed a noticeably different shade. Given these significant changes to the hair, the
greater the distance between sign and body, and therefore the greater chance for misidentification
of the thing to which the attributes belong.
Misidentification can occur given that the characters within the narrative will refer to the
newly created image as X, while X may or may not refer to itself as X, and the spectator may or
may not agree with identifying X as X. In The Crying Game, Dil is transformed at the hands of
Fergus. Her haircut produces a rupture in the narrative because multiple names are used in the
identification process: “Gotta make you a man,” “You’re trying to make look like him.” “No, I’m
turning you into something new,” “that thing,” “it,” “sick bitch,” and “I hardly recognize myself
anymore.” Clearly there is no agreed upon name upon which to call the image post-haircut:
clothes and hair recall Jody, Fergus calls her Dil, Dil refers to Dil in third person, Jude refers to
her as the “sick bitch,” and critics refer to her as a black man, a transvestite, a woman with a
penis, or a woman. As the complexity in naming indicates, misidentification of the image can
occur because what someone imagines can be radically different than another individual whether
they are part of the same culture or not. In his conceptualization of Monster Theory, Jeffrey
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Jerome Cohen theorizes the monster as a conceptual mechanism to understand the culture that
produces or creates the monster it fears. For Cohen, the monster is a mixed category, for it
“resists any classification built on hierarchy or a merely binary opposition, demanding instead a
‘system’ allowing polyphony, mixed response (difference in sameness, repulsion in attraction),
and resistance to integration” (7). With Cohen’s theorization, the image produced post-haircut can
lead to a misidentification because “any kind of alterity can be inscribed across (constructed
through) the monstrous body, but for the most part monstrous difference tends to be cultural,
political, racial, economic, sexual” (7). In short, reading the body that emerges from either the
Transparent Moderate Moment or the Transparent Violent Moment can challenge the politics of
identity that have been culturally defined and accepted as norm. Reading the new image is a
navigation and interpretation of the Opaque Movement of the film by witnessing the haircut at the
time of either Moment and deducing the “demand’ or “desire” that the resulting image is to
represent or identify.
Reading identity occurs with the haircut. At the moment of the haircut, the individual –
the generic embodied imaginer – performing the haircut shares a dual function with the spectator
– also the generic embodied imaginer – for as Scarry says, “the making of an artifact is a social
act, for the object (whether an art work or instead an object of everyday use) is intended as
something that will both enter into and itself elicit human responsiveness” (175). It is the
interplay and movement between the images on the screen as they name and identify the altered
object (image getting the haircut) and the spectator as they name and identify the image on the
screen and their subsequent identification with or against the altered object, that identity is
formed. Two distinctions can be made between the two types of imaginers defined by Scarry as
“the same generic embodied imaginer capable of picturing, making present, an absent friend, is
also capable of inventing both the idea and the materialized form of the telegraph, as well as
devising the specific message, ‘Come home at once,’ as he is also capable of inventing many
other mechanisms for transforming the condition of the absence into presence, the telephone,
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train, airplane, [hairstyle, body], all of which originate as the imagination’s object” (163-164) as
follows:
First, on-screen, the cutter/individual performing the transformation is ‘making present’ –
‘maning,’ ‘womaning,’ ‘transing,’ ‘sexing,’ ‘raceing’ or ‘othering,’ the object (person whose hair
is being cut) in a visible, active, participatory capacity. If the haircut occurs off-screen, the act of
making present can be assumed to be the artifact upon whose body the act was conferred;
however, intentionality of the making does not lie with the artifact created automatically. The
spectator reading the made artifact (image/body) must deduce the ‘specific message.’ For
example, dialogue such as: you should cut your hair, you need a makeover, I need a change, this
isn’t your real hair, and so on, voiced by the generic embodied imaginer which may or may not be
the body upon which the haircut was performed points to the intentionality of the making.
The distinction between the two types of on-screen generic embodied imaginers or
haircutters is determined via consent as defined between war and torture. Consent distinguishes
between warfare and torture and is always the production of an image of identity and the
transformation of the subject in assuming that image (Bhabha 63-64). To be ‘maned,’
‘womaned,’ ‘transed,’ or ‘othered’ is to be transformed into the presence of the generic embodied
imaginer’s imagined object. Scarry’s use of the gerund “imagining’ is rooted in the gerunds
‘maning,’ ‘womaning,’ ‘transing,’ ‘raceing,’ or ‘othering’ the imagined object. When an
individual decides to cut the hair of another individual or her own hair, he is operating under and
within the imagined and realized artifacts of civilization that are tied to the desired
sexed/gendered body that is being imagined (transforming the condition of absence into
presence). For example, in the case of Fergus and Dil, Fergus is transforming Dil into something
new, and yet, the artifacts of civilization that he is basing his transformation upon are based upon
an absent friend – Jody – that is constituted out of whatever attributes are used to name his body
in the first place – short afro, black, cricket whites, man, heterosexual, unseen penis, dominate,
ghostly, haunting, homosocial, and so forth.

22	
  

Second, off-screen, the spectator witnesses the on-screen act of making
(gendering/sexing/raceing) that occurs at the moment of the haircut. Through witnessing, the
spectator visually incorporates the artifact made present and adds the object into their mind
composed of referents of various artifacts of civilization. This statement reinforces Marriott’s
conception of incorporation through the eyes and stresses the importance of the Opaque
Movement as a source of referents upon which the ability to identify can be determined. To
clarify, Scarry states,
Seeing is seeing of x, and the one who has made the “x” has entered into the
interior of the other person’s seeing, entered there in the object of
perception. The objects of hearing, desire, hunger, touch, are not just
passively grasped by the fixed intentional states: the objects themselves act
on the state, sometimes initiating the state, sometimes modifying it,
increasing, decreasing, or eliminating it. Thus when intentional objects
come to include not just the rain, berries, stones, and the night but also
bread, bowls, church steeples, and radiators, [transgenders, homosexuals,
mixed race women and men of color, lesbians, monsters, or ghosts], there
comes to be an ongoing interaction at the (once private) center of human
sentience; for not only are the interior facts of sentience projected outward
into the artifact in the moment of its making, but conversely those artifacts
now enter the interior of other persons as the content of perception and
emotion. Thus in the transformation of a weapon into a tool, everything is
gained and nothing is lost. (Scarry 176)

Therefore, the more and disparate images of various types of bodies in motion that the generic
embodied imaginer is able to consume, the greater the pool of referents the imaginer is able to
draw from when making a new artifact of civilization from absence into presence. It should be
apparent that in the filmmaking process the more and different artifacts of civilization that are
used as a source of imagining the work of art (film) from the outset, the more and different types
of artifacts of civilization that will be consumed. In turn, expanding the artifacts of civilization
should expand the borders of culture within which the object (man, woman, transperson, other,
monster, ghost) is made and allowed to operate as an individual with an identity. As can be
deduced, this is important when it comes time to name the object made present.
Once the artifact made present (imagination’s object) has been made, the generic
embodied imaginer (cutter/spectator) names the object to alleviate the pain associated with the
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objectless fear that afflicted the generic embodied imaginer in the first place, thus causing him to
make the artifact present. Clearly the name of the imagined object created after the haircut need
not be congruent between the generic embodied imaginers. Naming the resulting object is based
upon the imaginer’s known artifacts of civilization or cultural beliefs that inform and define the
gendered/sexed/racialized identity of the object as
essentialized/authenticated/performed/constructed. For as Scarry notes, “Almost never is the
imagination ‘imagined’ without an object, though the Hebraic scriptures come very close to
requiring that believers do just that, that they apprehend the capacity for creation devoid of any
representable content” (164).
What is absent from this discussion so far should be apparent: the voice of the imagined
object in determining the name of that which was made present, namely the self. Now it may
seem that identification is obtained by seeing and consuming alone. For example in the stills we
have been discussing, it is easy to say Still (a) is a photograph of Jody, Still (b) is an image of
Jody, and Still (c) is an image of Dil dressed in Jody’s clothing. Yet, there is an absence once
again – sound, more specifically voice. The photograph does not speak. The still image does not
speak either. It is the image of the body in motion or fluidity that is given voice and thus, the
ability to name, to identify, and to conceptualize it that identity is also obtained. In the stills
above, voice is only given to one of the images when viewed in motion within the film. For the
spectator consuming the images above, a distinction must be made between identification of the
image within the white space of the narrative, and identification of the image apart from the white
space of the cinema.
The interplay between naming or identifying the image on-screen post haircut is
complex, though I contend preference should be given to the individual – the body conferred – in
the naming process. Though an incongruent desire to agree with or ignore the self-given identity
is more than simply complicated. On-screen characters choose to name themselves, or are named
by others, and in the naming an identity is established, fixed and unable to be altered as the
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process of filmmaking is complete. The haircut opens the ability for the identity to be changed
within the narrative. However, off-screen, characters are named and identified in a manner that
best suits the spectators own identification process. The negotiation between on-screen and offscreen is complicated and lends credence to Avery F. Gordon’s theoretical conception of life is
complicated in her work Ghostly Matters: Hauntings and the Social Imagination. In her study of
ghosts and hauntings, Gordon proposes a new method of reading culture, namely through the
ghost and hauntings of the social imagination. Combined with her second theoretical postulation
of complex personhood, Gordon moves between the past and the present to recognize that the
dead, ghosts, and the distractions and distortions of hauntings have a profound affect on reality.
It is within Gordon’s concepts of life is complicated and complex personhood that
warfare, torture and consent return to the argument to voice their importance to the process of
identification or identity formation. During the Transparent Moderate Moment (TMM) and the
Transparent Violent Moment (TVM) warfare and torture are on display as the tension between
demand and desire to make, to produce, to create the imaginer’s object (pre-given or self-fulfilled
identity) is realized. Scarry distinguishes between warfare and torture as follows: 1) In warfare,
the individual consents to use their body in the confirmation process. In essence, the individuals
engage in battle until a winner is able to confirm a pre-given identity upon the loser who consents
to the beliefs of the other – assumes the pre-given identity. 2) On the other hand, in torture,
consent to have the body used in the confirmation process is not exercised. In essence, individuals
who are tortured do not consent to have their body transformed. In order to get the individual to
assume the imaginer’s object, destruction of the artifacts of civilization (man, woman, woman
with a penis, transvestite, transgender, homosexual, heterosexual, female, femininity, nationality,
as but a few examples) must be employed to break the individual and get them to consent to
assuming the pre-given or self-fulfilled identity. Clearly consent in warfare and torture has “a gulf
of meaning, intention, connotation, and tone [that] separates them” (Scarry 173).
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In a film, characters engage in dialogue, banter, vocal interplay in order to establish their
own voice and distinguish their identity apart from the other characters. Either before or after a
haircut, characters will give voice to their assuming a pre-given or self-fulfilled identity. Consent
is the willingness to undergo to the alteration or self-alteration that occurs at the moment of the
haircut. In warfare, characters engage in battle until one concedes to the will and beliefs of the
other: in torture, consent is not given and the will of the other is dismissed. As can be seen, onscreen characters will engage in warfare or torture between individuals, groups, nations, or the
self. A distinction between consent in the two types of identity making and unmaking is the
utilization of a weapon or tool in the transformation process. A weapon or tool (scissors, blade,
knife, razors, perm solution, dye, and so on) can be seen as a benign form of creation (tool) or as
a weapon in the deconstruction of an artifact of civilization as the weapon is brandished as a
means of intentionally inflicting pain onto the other individual. As shown, Scarry is correct in
stating that it is the intentionality of the artifact (weapon or tool) in the process of making that the
movement between weapon and tool can be made.
Off-screen spectators and characters within the film will also engage in warfare and
torture as spectators acknowledge the character voicing her own identity (warfare) or they ignore
the character and wound, abuse, mishandle, or misrecognize the character via a tortuous need to
self-identify. Gordon’s concept of complex personhood is understood in this respect in that the
interaction between spectators and character is a complication “between what is immediately
available as a story and what their imaginations are reaching toward” (4).

In the chapters that follow, I will explore these conceptualizations further. As I indicated earlier,
Chapter 1, Setting the Rollers in Cinematic Hair, further establishes the theoretical
foundation for these concepts as I work through theorists Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, David
Marriott, Kaja Silverman, Homi Bhabha, and Elaine Scarry. Working through these theorists and
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various films, I argue that hair points to gender, sex and sexuality of the character. It is in
consuming these artifacts of civilization that a haircut produces a rupture in the identification
process. For it is in, the negotiation between the tension of demand and desire to assume or
confirm a pre-given or self-fulfilled that identity can be read or understood.
In Chapter 2, Fergus – Performing the Heterosexual White Man, I examine the
character of Fergus to ask the question: What does it mean to perform the heterosexual white
male. By examining Fergus throughout the Opaque Movement, I argue that his first haircut seen
as the Transparent Violent Moment off-screen leads to his performance of white as defined by
Winston Wheeler Dixon and Gwendolyn Audrey Foster. The second haircut that Fergus receives
on-screen at the hands of Dil leads to his performance of heterosexuality as defined by Jonathan
Katz, Diane Richardson, and Derek Neal.
In Chapter 3, Jude – the Only Woman in the Game, I examine the character of Jude
by arguing that the critical animosity towards her character allows for an exploration of the
rupture of language. By utilizing Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s study of monster theory, I argue that
critical terms used to describe Jude as a monster or monstrous feminine open up the term and
concept of woman: bodies who transgress culture and are marginalized at the borders of society
as monsters explodes the concept of woman. As Jude is critically described as a monster or in
possession of the monstrous feminine as defined by Barbara Creed, I question the possibility that
the Transparent Violent Moment of Jude crosses racial and sexual barriers from white woman to
a body at the margins that could include Dil and Jody within its monstrosity.
In the final chapter, Dil — Something New in The Crying Game, I examine The
Crying Game from the perspective of a ghost story. Utilizing Avery F. Gordon’s concept of
complex personhood, I argue that Dil is a visual representation of something new, something that
nobody recognizes. This conceptualization of her character argues that the Opaque Movement
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with its catalogue of referents operates like a haunting of reality and allows for alternate readings
of cinema and culture. As the concluding chapter, I weave concepts from previous chapters to
show how the Transparent Violent Moment of Dil and the Transparent Moderate Moment of
Fergus, of which she was an active participant, can only occur within the Opaque Movement.
Overall, this chapter highlights why cinematic haircuts are central to understanding the politics of
identity construction within cinema and culture.
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Setting the Rollers in Cinematic Hair
Chapter 1
Yet it deserves more attention, because long, short, curled or straight, powdered, dyed or natural (and in the case of this
chapter, cut away from the body), hair itself is clearly loaded with meanings that are both part of and contribute to our
understanding of the social body, and the culture in which it is formed. But, at the same time, disembodied, hair has a
shadowy and complex relationship to this body and implicit within this is an unspoken understanding of hair’s potential
unruliness.
—Janice Miller, Hair Without a Head: Disembodiment and the Uncanny

To groom their hair, people have been willing to spend time, energy, and money, as well as endure lengthy and
uncomfortable procedures. They have hunted down elusive reptiles and plants to obtain hair-care ingredients, plucked
out masses of hair with clam shells, sat under hot machines wearing tightly metal rods, borne two-foot tall wigs on their
heads, used chemicals that burned the scalp, and undergone surgical procedures, to name a few methods. People have
washed, combed, brushed, cut, colored, arranged, and decorated their hair in countless ways, ranging from simple to
quite elaborate. The resulting styles have reflected spiritual beliefs, as well as social, political, and historical events, as
well as the materials and technology that were available for styling hair.
—Victoria Sherrow, Encyclopedia of Hair: A Cultural History

Let me start by asking why are we so consumed with certain hairstyles, certain looks, certain
colors, textures, lengths, certain qualities of hair? Why is it that we gaze so intently into the
mirror trying to make sure we are looking the way we want to be seen? Could it be that we are
afraid. Not just afraid that we might lose it. No, that’s why we have Rogaine and wigs; I mean
afraid that we might be viewed as sick or unhealthy; that our lack of hair might indicate that we
have been invaded, penetrated by something outside of us like a virus or a disease or that we have
some bad genes or more simply, that we won’t be considered beautiful. I believe that we are
afraid that we won’t be able to tell people who we are without our hair. Sure, our skin might say
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that we are black or white or some shade in-between, but our hair, our hair says something else
about us. I believe it tells people if we are a man or a woman. It speaks to our gender. Since we
cannot confirm or deny the presence or absence of our gender through our clothes, we must have
some other stand-in for gender – our hair. It’s not as if we can walk around with our pants down
around our ankles or our skirts hiked up in our underwear. No, you must use your hair. Our hair
emerges from within us, so we must read hair as an external marker of our interiority, in this case
– gender. Trouble arises when hair lengths and styles blur these gender lines; when the gendered
body is unable to be read, confirmed, and denied. Dress, make-up, and jewelry are external: all
can mislead. But hair, hair that emerges from within cannot be separated from the idea of body. It
must be treated, contained, domesticated to improve our ability to fix the identity and
identification of others and ourselves in the world. Our treatment of hair must conform to the
conception of gender. To approach this further, let us look at the question of what is the gender
that hair points to in any given body.
In her work, Gender Trouble, Judith Butler examines the issue of gender and asks what is
gender? Butler argues that gender is created out of the individual’s desire to reach the essence of
gender: through essentializing the body one creates the very gender they are looking for and
through the constant performance of gender over time the body itself internalizes the very gender
it is performing. What is noticeable in her argument is that the biology of the body is absent: the
body of the individual is neither male nor female it simply “is”. Butler questions the interior
component of performance arguing that the psychic interiority of the individual performing
gender over time through sustainable acts needs further exploration. I hope this discussion adds to
that theoretical discourse surrounding her argument, for if gender is attained through
performance, I ask: What part of that psychic interiority “chooses” which acts to perform and
which to exclude? The choice of performance should not be read as a conscious act on the part of
the individual but as some hidden interiority of the self that cannot be reached easily as the body
has been run through the discursive rollers of society and identification over time. However, the

30	
  

interiority of the psyche is a component in the construction of the self as evidenced by the choice
of performative gendered acts – whether those acts are performed publicly or privately. Thus the
choice of performative acts contributes to the gender essentialized or the gender being sought by
the individual, consciously or unconsciously. While I use the word choice at this moment, the
meaning of the act of choosing carries a double meaning and is more directly tied to the term
consentvi as described by Elaine Scarry in her work The Body in Pain: The Making an Unmaking
of the World, and thus choice will become more apparent later in the discussion as we talk about
the differences in consent at the time of a makeover moment – haircut or hair transformation.
For now, exactly how this relates to hair becomes apparent in the choice of hairstyle that
an individual chooses to replicate when performing a specific gender. Is the hair worn long, short,
corn rowed, braided, natural, straight, curly, sophisticated, professional? During my viewings and
reviewing of various films, it became apparent to me that for any given character in a film, the
image had a hairstyle that indicated either male or female. For example, Karyn Kusama’s 2000
film Girlfight presents an overarching movement of hairstyles with gendered implications that are
at times subtle and much more troubling to spectators and other characters. Girlfight tells the
story of Diana Guzman, an angry tomboy who lives with her sensitive brother and oppressive
father. Her mother has committed suicide and she feels like a prisoner of the Projects. A troubled
student who gets into fights often and is thus on the edge of being expelled, Diana finds purpose
for her life inside the boxing ring. This predominately male-dominated sport is thrown into
turmoil as Diana finds her inner and outer strength training and fighting alongside the men. The
film situates Diana in an environment that harbors preconceived notions of what is and what isn’t
a woman. In the movement of her character from the beginning frame to the last shot, she

vi

Scarry describes consent as such: “in war, the persons whose bodies are used in the confirmation process have given
their consent over this most radical use of the human body while in torture no such consent is exercised” (21). Further,
Scarry states, “torture begins at precisely the point where the other [war] has left off: it starts by appropriating and
deconstructing the artifacts that are the products of creation – wall, window, door, room, shelter, medicine, law, friend,
country, [hairstyle], both as they exist in their material form and as the created contents of consciousness” (145).
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navigates this space with a body that complicates and challenges the expectations of femininity
and masculinity.
In one scene, a woman dressed in tight clothes with loose, flowing hair walks through a
doorway and seconds later, Diana, dressed as a tomboy with her hair in cornrows walks out. This
scene juxtaposes the expectations and representations of gender: long flowing hair on an image in
feminine clothing against another image that implies masculine or possibly butch lesbian. This
scene forces the spectator to question Diana’s femininity and sexuality as depicted in hair choices
as opposed to clothing. While the clothing on the “girl” is tight, Diana is seen in other parts of the
film in tight clothes as are other male characters: in all instances, the body of the individual
characters is covered, hidden, and interchangeable between the feminine image, the masculine
image and Diana’s image – the differences in body lies in the hairstyles. The interchangeability in
clothing denies a distinction in gendered image – any body can wear any clothes. Clothing then
hides the body, denies the sex of the body; it is as if, to extrapolate Luce Irigaray’s argument in
her work This Sex Which Is Not One, in clothes, the genitalia of the body “are simply absent,
masked, sewn back up inside their ‘crack’” (Conboy, Medina, Stanbury 251).
Working with Irigaray’s argument regarding the depiction of the female body in Greek
statuary, I contend that the naked body, regardless of ‘gender,’ is eroticized and unlike the cover
up of marble on female statuary, clothing denies the horror of something to see in both bodies. By
hiding the genitals of the body, clothing excludes the something to see of the body and with it
hides the sexed representation of the body. If that is indeed the case, something else must stand in
for the denied and excluded organs of the body. As I stated before, clothing can be
interchangeable, so that something else is hair. Hair becomes the stand-in for sex; and it is the
length of hairvii that society gives gender meaning. As Lola Young states in her reading of The
Crying Game, “attitudes to sexual norms are anchored by the external evidence of gender offered

vii

While women can indeed choose a short hairstyle, like the pixie as seen in films like Roman Holiday and Waiting to
Exhale, clothing and make-up are used to reinforce the gender and sexuality of the character.
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by clothing, hairstyle, physical bearing and so on” (Kirkham and Thumim 275). Therefore, hair
(and hair length by extension) must stave off the implications that may arise from the innuendo
that “certain sexual practices compel the question: what is woman, what is man?” (Butler xi).
Irigaray argues that the denial of female sexuality denies the female as a sex. She argues
that women are commodities to be traded by men for sexual pleasure. For her, female sexuality is
rooted in biological determinism and is interrupted by the presence of a penis between the two
lips of the vagina and is no more than a prop in male fantasies. Irigaray states “Woman ‘touches
herself’ all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of
two lips in continuous contact….This autoeroticism is disrupted by a violent break-in: the brutal
separation of the two lips by a violating penis, an intrusion that distracts and deflects the woman
from this ‘self-caressing’ she needs if she is not to incur the disappearance of her own pleasure in
sexual relations” (Conboy, Medina, Stanbury 249). While she concedes that some women could
gain pleasure from heterosexual sex, Irigaray argues for a political break from traditional Marxist
notions of heterosexual commodity exchange and calls for the pleasure of homosexual or lesbian
sex.
Within the context of The Crying Game, Irigaray’s call for female sexual plurality should
include the character of Dil as I argue that Dil is but an example of a “woman [who] has sex
organs more or less everywhere. She finds pleasure almost anywhere. Even if we refrain from
invoking the hystericization of her entire body, the geography of her pleasure is far more
diversified, more multiple in its difference, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly
imagined – in an imaginary rather too narrowly focused on sameness” (Conboy, Medina,
Stanbury 252-253). Dil is a female no longer denying the secret of the feminine biological body,
but instead is a female body that challenges the heterosexual, homosexual, and lesbian gendered
notions of female genitalia by displaying its “’thickness’ of that ‘form,’ the layering of its
volume, its expansions and contradictions and even the spacing of the moments in which it
produces itself as form” (Conboy, Medina, Stanbury 251). In her reading of the ‘surface’ of Dil’s
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body, Young agrees with this assertion by stating “In any case, according to normative
perceptions rather than being a body ‘without organs’ Dil has an excess of organs” (Kirkham and
Thumim 280). Thus, while Irigaray argues that some women “may find pleasure in that role, by
proxy, even certain,” (Conboy, Medina, Stanbury 250) the acceptance of a female body with sex
organs more or less everywhere, must include Dil as a representation of the female body
expressing female sexuality, unless women fully embrace the role of a commodified sexual body
containing the site for preferred (heterosexual) sexual penetration.
Returning to Girlfight and The Crying Game, a body with long hair troubles the
expectations of the spectator who knows that the character of Diana is played by a biological
female – Michelle Rodriguez; while upon re-viewing, the spectator knows the character of Dil is
played by a biological male – Jaye Davidson. What are these cinematic images supposed to
represent? Are the cinematic images female? Are they male? Are they bodies in transition? Or
more aptly, aren’t these cinematic images of a woman fighting for individual expression of
femaleness and sexual identity? Beyond Girlfight and The Crying Game, these questions apply to
the 1997 film GI Jane and the character of Jordan. Like Dil, Jordan is a character whose body
comes under examination after she has shaved her long flowing locks. In one telling scene,
Jordan exclaims to a male character in the film, “suck my dick!” For spectators and characters
within the narrative, the line may be read as sarcasm, however the film has indicated that Jordan’s
female biology has been suspended with her menstruation ceasing and so her biology could have
changed to male within the narrative post-haircut. In these films, the biology of the actors playing
the characters informs the gender of the character more then the films themselves. In The Crying
Game, the questions of Dil’s gender troubles are just “details baby, details.” While in Girlfight
the film troubles the expectations of the spectator by presenting scenes and images that call into
question society’s constructions and expectations of women. The following exchange between
Diana and her father illustrates this: “Diana: Don’t front like I’m some sort of girly girl, cuz I’m
not. Father: Would it hurt for you to wear a skirt every once in a while?” (Kusama)
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The narrative never dresses Diana in a skirt, thus the film never takes an apparent stance
on her gender one way or another. The subtle presentations of Diana in several scenes seem to
present her in various hairstyles that would traditionally be associated with femaleness (long
flowing hair) rather than maleness (cornrows). This binary depiction of her identity presents itself
in one particular scene during a practice boxing session with her trainer. The image of Diana is
depicted in front of a mirror that is split in half; on the top of the mirror we see the top of her head
in cornrows, in the bottom half of the mirror is the lower half of her head with long flowing hair.
This scene presents a body that could be male or female engaged in athletic training. Diana is
shaping her body into something that is strong, confident, and capable of expressing itself in
society. The film doesn’t make it clear if this body is going to be male or female, but rather that it
could be both and neither at the same time. This scene is implying that the perceptions society has
regarding what is a female body and what is a male body are no longer apparent on biology alone.
The image is an expression of repression and freedom combined; it is a reflection of the human
body itself – a combination of masculine and feminine traits.
In order to confront these images of femininity, the film presents several scenes that call
into question the identity of Diana and thus force the spectator to begin questioning their own
preconceived notions of how they internalize the images they watch in movies. One of these
scenes has Diana sparing with a camera point of view opponent: Diana punches the camera, and
in turn the spectator. This scene directly challenges the spectator to confront his own notions of
Diana and gender identity. Another scene shows Diana running in cornrows and a ponytail to
the sound of a voiceover saying, “Heat. What is heat then? The energy possessed by molecules
in motion” (Kusama). Diana is a body in motion expressing her own self-generated sexual
identity. Diana is a different, yet similar, representation of the female body, as is Dil. For both
bodies, it is hair that is used to trouble and define the body. Like Jordan in GI Jane, it is in the
cutting of Dil’s hair that the body is realigned into a male-defined position.
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While Girlfight presents a more apparent argument for how hair is used to express
gender, all films like The Crying Game present images to the spectator that reaffirm the look of
male or female; they are simply more subtle, more opaque in the commentary. Despite other
scenes that attempt to depict Diana as feminine especially when she is with her boyfriend (a not
so subtle need to reaffirm her heterosexuality), the spectator has already consumed an image of a
body in between male and female, maybe a body in transition? The facets of identity that hair in
cinema (gender, race, sexuality, etc.) presents are available for the spectator to accept or resistviii;
however, regardless of the spectator’s choice of interpretation, consumption of the image has
already occurred. The gender-troubled body with no discernible hairstyle has rooted itself into
the mind of the spectator. For the spectator, consumption has occurred through the biting of the
images projected onto the screen with their eyes.

The Visual Consumption of Hair: The Importance of the Cut
In his work entitled On Black Men, David Marriott works through the theory of
incorporation by psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel to discuss how the camera “bites” reality.
Navigating through a discussion of lynching photographs in the South, an examination of Robert
Mapplethorpe’s X Portfolio, specifically the photographs Hooded Man and Man in a Polyester
Suit, and the personal photographs by Jeffrey Dahmer of his victims, Marriott explores what it
means to visually consume and incorporate a photographic image through the eyes: “To
incorporate, to eat, through the eyes; to want to look, and look again, in the name of appreciating
and destroying, loving and hating” (27). By working with Marriott, it is my hope to contribute to
his theoretical discussion of image consumption by adapting his theoretical framework to the
looking at and incorporating of moving images. To establish his framework for incorporation,
viii

In “Black Spectatorship: Problems of Identification and Resistance,” Manthia Diawara develops “the notion of the
resisting spectator” (892) as a challenge to traditional notions of spectator identification that don’t account for the black
spectator viewing their like on screen. It is my goal to expound this conception of the resisting spectator to any
spectator who resists identification with their cinematic representation on the screen, regardless of race, gender,
sexuality, and so on. In their resistance, the spectator challenges the preconceptions and normative identifications
associated with a given cinematic image and its like-for-like referent outside the narrative.
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Marriott states:
…what if looking is a form of incorporation, of taking something inside (this
may be part of its anxiety?). Let’s note that judgement [sic], for Freud (and in
our context, this telling), is always a question of taking something into the
mouth or spitting it out. An insight that the German psychoanalyst, Otto
Fenichel, will develop in terms of incorporation, or devoration, by the eyes.
‘When someone gazes intensely at an object’, writes Fenichel at the beginning
of his ‘The scopophilic instinct and identification’, first published in 1935, ‘we
say that he “devours it with his eyes,” and there are many similar phrases’
(Fenichel 1935: 373). The symbolic equation to look at = to devour, supports
Fenichel’s remarkable extension of Freud’s theory of scopophilia: the drive to
look at a sexual object. ‘The eye’, Fenichel writes, ‘is conceived of as an organ
that robs and bites’ (ibid.: 395). It can even, in fantasy, give access to the
interior of the body. Wanting to devour, to take something in via the eyes, can
run parallel, in Fenichel’s view, with the wish to destroy something by looking
at it; ‘or else’, he writes ‘the act of looking itself has already acquired the
significance of a modified form of destruction’ (ibid.: 377) (Marriott 25-27)

In this telling passage, Marriott establishes for himself a method of critically examining the
effects of photographic image consumption. By looking at lynching photographs and
Mapplethorpe’s nudes, Marriott critiques the photographer and the spectator, both of whom, in
the capturing and looking of an image open themselves up to dissection over the subject matter –
the black body in death or artistic posture. By choosing these specific lines including the language
of “destroy” and “destruction,” Marriott presents an unobjective point of inquiry. His examination
of the topic is from the point of view of a black man identifying with the body lynched, the body
eroticized. He freely admits that his initial review of Mapplethorpe didn’t allow for a space of the
black spectator desiring the black body. I would ask then of his argument, shouldn’t a space for
desire of the black body by a black body not open up the possible space for the wanted
destruction of the black body and the associated pleasure it produces in the white spectator not
extend to the black spectator as well? For Marriott, the identification of the white spectator with
the photographic image has racist overtones and does not allow for a space of objective
incorporation. While I admit that racist pleasure is indeed present for some white spectators of
lynching photographs, how is the possibility of self-hating pleasure by black spectators not
examined, especially if shocking images produce a desire to look, and look again? Marriott states:
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The risk of looking at whatever a photographer like Mapplethorpe chooses to exhibit,
then, is that you might see something you don’t want to see; quite simply, you might
be shocked, and he might fail to engage you in his aesthetic, even though you’re
prepared to look, and look again. The question is where does such (obsessive)
looking leave you? What defence [sic] do you have against the disgust generated by
an image made irredeemable by lack or excess? Against a failure in identification
with, or aestheticisation [sic] of, a photograph [cinematic image – character]? The
type of defence described by Fenichel, perhaps: a devouring scopophilia. Take it in
so that you can control it, torment it, spit it out. But the image will leave its trace.
(Marriott 28)

Visual engagement with film requires the seeing of characters, and in that process of viewing,
spectators devour, consume and eat the image. The biting, the devouring, the desire to
aestheticize or not, and the ability to identify with, or not, the cinematic image begins the moment
the first character enters the narrative. In The Crying Game, the film opens with a tracking shot
from right to left underneath a bridge near Laytown in County Meade. In the background a
carnival fairground can be seen. While there are images of people moving along the shore, the
indistinct appearance doesn’t clue the spectator as to the types of people that are going to be
represented in the narrative. From beneath the bridge, the film cuts to a close up of speakers that
are projecting the previously non-diegetic music, thus suturing the music to the narrative. The
camera then pulls back from the speakers and fills the screen with representations of various
background characters at the fair/carnival. This shot then begins the Opaque Movement in The
Crying Game.
In any film, the introduction of the first character, group of characters or character image,
sets the foundation for the look of the film. With each visual bite of a scene, images are consumed
and a catalogue of referents is posited into the recesses of the consciousness. Images with long,
short, black, brown, and blond hair work in concert with clothing, makeup and skin color to
establish the gender and racial construction of the film. Each of the characters enter the mind and
leave a trace on the spectator’s conscious mind; this trace, this referent, this ghostly imageix will

ix

Upon his death, Jody becomes the immaterial motivations behind the haircuts. In the second half of the film,
spectator’s become aware of his physical absence and cognizant of his powerful presence as Fergus’s dream man, the
photographic image, the ghost haunting and informing the narrative. As Avery F. Gordon states in Ghostly Matters:
Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, “If haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often a
seething presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is just the sign, or the
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be referred to after a hair transformation has occurred in the narrative as a possible source of like
for like comparisons. This process of establishing a gender, sexual and racial reference occurs
from the moment the first character enters the narrative and moves through the film until the last
character is shown on screen. For the spectator, visual consumption extends to all images
captured in a scene – magazine covers, billboards, advertisements, background and secondary
characters, everything within the scope of the frame, and sometimes beyond.

Figure 2: Still Image of Dil and
Jody from The Crying Game

In one scene of The Crying Game, Fergus admires a picture of Dil and Jody together. In
the photograph (see Figure 2), the hair on Dil pushes beyond the frame of the wallet. The massy
and voluminous tendrils occupy a space beyond the narrative and allude to a bigness of character;
it is a subtle way of saying you are consuming a lot of woman – she is more than this frame can
contain, she is more than you can handle. Situated against a white background, her neck long and
exposed reveals no indication of maleness. Juxtaposed against the minimal and contained short
afro of Jody as it gets lost in the dark background, the femaleness of Dil is meant to be read in the
length of her hair. The line down the middle of the photograph establishes a clear distinction
between male and female. The presence of Fergus’s thumb on the face of Jody alludes to the
empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place.” Jody’s “meddling” in the narrative affects
Fergus and inspires his motivation to cut Dil’s hair. In the mind of the spectator and the critic, Jody’s haunting presence
in the narrative acts upon their “taken-for-granted realities” and influences their personal histories as he becomes the
narrative referent in their assertions that the characters of Jody and Dil are both black men because they both have short
afros and a penis.
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possibility that he wants to take his place in the male/female dynamic; and maybe not just replace
but to become the body in the racially, gendered and sexual dynamic.x The line also establishes a
distinction between black and ethnic as the intense lighting blows out the color from Dil’s cheeks
and whitewashes her into exoticism. These distinctions are ignored post-haircut as Fergus strives
to materialize the Jody of his dreams and the Jody of a different photograph; they are ignored as
Jody and Dil are forced into a sameness of identity – gender, race and sexuality when both are
identified as black men – through a short afro. The distinctions are ignored because the film does
not provide sufficient referents for which the spectator can determine like for like identification.
With only a handful of characters of non-white complexion and ethnic hair texture in the film,
misinterpretation or misrecognition of the character’s gender, race and sexuality becomes clear.
In another scene meant to shock, engage, and challenge, spectators consume the reveal
of Dil’s character as a body in possession of a penis. In this scene Neil Jordan has exhibited an
image that the spectator may not want to see. It is in the previous aestheticism of and desiring for
Dil’s presumed female body that the spectator is left with a feeling of disgust and a desire to look
and look again. Further, the spectator gains an opportunity to control and torment the character,
however they will not be able to spit out the image. While Marriott suggests that the spectator can
spit out the image, he rightfully states the image will leave its trace upon the consciousness of the
spectator; however, he does not sufficiently expound on the inherent inability for the mind to spit
out the image. For once the image has been viewed, the mind will not purge itself of the image.
Different than oral consumption, visual consumption will always be digested and internalized.
While the image may disappear from the forefront of the spectator’s memory, it will continue to
haunt the viewer; the image will operate as a ghostly memory subjecting the spectator to think
and rethink every decision, action, and body it encounters and has encountered. For Fergus, the

x

Amy Zillax argues for the fluidity of race performance by arguing that in one moment in the film when Dil and
Fergus are facing each other post-haircut, they are the same – mirror images of each other. Inherent in her argument,
which she doesn’t state openly, skin color is not relevant to the sameness of the two characters in this scene. They
could both be black, white, or ethnic; regardless, they are the same.
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inability to spit out the image of Dil’s possession of a penis bends and twists his relationship with
her momentarily until he is able to cut her hair and reposition her into a ghostly position of a
once-seen body that he knows possessed a penis – Jody in his cricket whites. The cutting of Dil’s
long, feminine, massy hair allows Fergus to digest what he has seen and incorporate it into his
consciousness only by transforming the body into a more palatable consumable.
With the haircutting of Dil, it is as if Fergus has dissected Dil and created an image that
he can devour without wanting to spit out. For spectators who viewed Mapplethorpe’s
photographs and for which I will extend freely to viewers of The Crying Game, Marriott states,
“Looking at Mapplethorpe’s work…was ‘like undergoing surgery’ (ibid,: II, 73). Like being cut
open, and having something cut in or cut out” (24). While Marriott is talking about how
spectators were having information cut out of them or cut into them at the sight of the
photograph, I want to challenge and extend this thought of looking as a surgical process to the
character of Dil at the moment of the haircut. For the character looking at herself in the mirror
during the moment of the cut it was like undergoing surgery – being cut open, and having
something cut in or cut out: exactly what was being cut in or cut out was her gender!
For Fergus to consume and devour – visually and sexually (the post-coital cigarette) –
this new image, this new body before him, he needed to replicate and materialize the ghostly
image that occupied his dreams and was frozen in a photograph. Fergus required a referent
against which he could reposition both Dil and himself. This referent, Jody with a short afro in his
cricket whites, occupied a space in the narrative that had been viewed and would be viewed
again, and its acquisition in Fergus’s and the spectator’s consciousness would only be obtained
through a reflection of the film narrative, of the images previously consumed and incorporated.
Kaja Silverman provides a robust way of looking at this method of incorporation and devoration
with her theoretical conception of suture: “the concept of suture attempts to account for the means
by which the subject emerges within discourse” (Rosen 219).
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Within the concept of suture, the spectator inserts himself into the symbolic register (the
film) in the guise of a signifier (character identification), and in so doing, gains meaning at the
expense of their own physical identity position. For the individual who identifies with a character
in the film, the person feels that they are taking the place of the missing substance (interiority) of
the image and filling it with their own personhood. This identification, this moment when the
spectator identifies with the character, is when the process of suture is successful. With the
concept of suture, Silverman establishes a cinematic model that is rooted in the interlocking shots
of a film. She argues “Shot relationships are seen as the equivalent of syntactic ones in linguistic
discourse, as the agency whereby meaning emerges and a subject-position is constructed for the
viewer” (Rosen 220). For a film to attain meaning the relationships between shots must be
seamless; for the spectator, the feeling of lack or absence at not seeing a portion of the film must
be sufficiently sutured over so as to remain within the narrative. At the heart of this discussion is
the importance of the cut between shots. Silverman argues “equally important to the cinematic
organization are the operations of cutting and excluding…the cut guarantees that both the
preceding and the subsequent shots will function as structuring absences to the present shot.
These absences make possible a signifying ensemble, convert one shot into a signifier of the next
one, and the signified of the preceding one” (Rosen 222). Given the importance of the cut to
Silverman’s argument, I want to extend the cut beyond the editing of film and state the haircut or
transformation to hair is the visual narrative representation of the film cut or editing of film. The
haircut itself not only slices away the character’s hair and with it the current identity position, but
it cuts the spectator’s viewing of the film and makes them cognizant of the editing process.
Following Silverman’s thinking, the moment a character’s hair is cut, the shot takes on significant
importance as the character undergoing the makeover (haircut or hair transformation) becomes
the signifier to a new identity and a signified of a previous identity.
The 1999 film Jawbreaker provides a stellar example of this suturing process and the
importance of the cut in constructing the Transparent Violent Moment which points to the
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death/rebirth of a character as a result of an extreme change in hairstyle. Jawbreaker tells the
story of a group of friends who accidently kill a friend with a jawbreaker candy. When she
overhears the friends discussing the murder, Fern Mayo is presented with an option: let the
popular girls transform the meekly bookworm into the popular Vylette or don’t. The moment of
Fern’s hair transformation becomes the signifying ensemble in the film. In the shot sequence,
Fern with long brown hair is superimposed over Liz, with long brown hair, inside the coffin.
Then Vylette is superimposed over the body with long brown hair in the coffin. Finally, the
blonde image of Vylette rises, as if born, from the shampoo chair. The following figures depict
the shot importance of this moment in the narrative.

a.

b.

c.

d.
Figure 3: Still Images from Jawbreaker: a. Liz Purr being laid to rest, b. Overlay of Fern
whose long brown hair mimics Liz’s conveys death of character identity, c. Overlay of Vylette
follows previous shot to indicate birth of Vylette, d. Vylette being born in shampoo chair

With the cutting of hair, Fern as mousy bookworm is laid to rest and the new identity of Vylette is
sutured into place. The new image – a short blonde bob – is visually similar to the character of
Marci; maintaining a visual link with a previously established character provides a referent and
grounds the new identity of Vylette within the narrative. The apparent presence of a referent
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allows suture to reestablish itself with minimal disruption to the spectator. However, the presence
of a referent (male-identified characters share a similar hairstyle) can trouble the spectator as
indicated before when I described the character of Jordan in GI Jane. Another example of the
Transparent Violent Moment and a female character that undergoes an extreme change is the
character of Ripley in Alien 3. In the 1992 film, the character of Ripley crashes onto a penal
colony. As a result of bug infestations, the character shaves off her locks. At this point in the
narrative she is like for like similar to the male prisoners – dress and hair style. Unlike Girlfight
which takes an opaque approach to Diana’s gender or GI Jane which troubles Jordan’s sex
(“Suck my dick!), Alien 3 seeks to reaffirm Ripley’s sex as female – the film has the character
engage in sexual relations with a fellow prisoner and impregnates her with an alien.

a.

b.

Figure 4: Still Images from The Crying Game: Photograph of drag performer (a) in Metro bar with a
dark bob serves as a referent for photograph of Jude (b) after getting her haircut during the
Transparent Violent Moment.

In The Crying Game, Natasha Richardson’s Jude also undergoes an extreme and violent hair
transformation off-screen between the first half and second half of the film. Critics of
Richardson’s character indicate that the character is violent, aggressive and a scorpion.xi I would
argue that the hostility directed towards the character is a result of her extreme hair change that
shifts from blond to a severe red bob. Inherent to the hostility is anger over her elimination of the
cinematic marker of beauty – the star image with long flowing locks, preferably blonde. For
spectators, given the reveal of Dil’s biological appearance as male, the extreme change in Jude
xi

Handler, Hill, Edge, Backus and Doan, and Jordan himself as interviewed by Burke, among others.
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troubles the spectator that has an unconscious referent in a drag performer. The similarity
between Jude and the drag performer, shown in the previous images, haunts the spectators’
consciousness as they begin to question the gender and race of the character. xii
The haircut opens up the consciousness of the spectator. The psychological wound
produced by the haircut, forces the spectator to search, consciously or unconsciously through the
narrative for a referent. The presence of a referent allows for suture to close the gap; however, in
the search, given the spectators’ awareness of identification with a character, an awareness of
their own identity position becomes prescient. The search for the referent requires the spectator to
move in-between the shots in the film, in-between the narrative, and ultimately in-between their
own personal history to locate a referent upon which they can position their own identity against.
Homi Bhabha states “It is always in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is
articulated: the phantasmic space of possession that no one subject can singly or fixedly occupy,
and therefore permits the dream of the inversion of roles” (Bhabha 63). The haircut opens up a
space in-between the character’s identity position at the beginning of the film and after the
haircut. The haircut, unlike the edit that suture closes, makes the spectator aware, makes them an
active participant in the construction of the character’s identity. The haircut is a realignment or
shifting of the self, it forces a becoming of identity. The haircut is a reminder of the fluidity of
identity.

xii

At the beginning of the film, Jody attempts to slide his hand up Jude’s skirt but is brushed away. This scene is
repeated two other times in the narrative when Fergus attempts to slide his hand up Dil’s skirt and is brushed away, and
at the end of the film when Dil attempts to fellate Fergus post haircut and is brushed away. In all three instances,
clothing is hiding the genitalia/sex/gender. In addition to hiding the sex, is the brushing aside of the sexual advance not
hiding the sexuality of the character?
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Witnessing the Haircut: Distinguishing between the Transparent Moderate Moment and
the Transparent Violent Moment
In “Interrogating Identity: Frantz Fanon and the postcolonial prerogative,” Bhabha poses the
concept of fluid identity and the idea of in-betweenness. To conceptualize his theory on identity,
Bhabha recalls an Althusserian notion of hailing regarding the formation of an individual’s
identity. He states “three conditions that underlie an understanding of the process of identification
in the analytic of desire emerge” (Bhabha 63). Bhabha argues that for an individual “to exist is to
be called into being in relation to an otherness, its look or locus….Second: the very place of
identification, caught in the tension of demand and desire, is a space of splitting…[and] Finally,
the question of identity is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling
prophecy – it is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the
subject in assuming that image” (Bhabha 63-64). Thus, an individual comes into being in relation
to being next to someone or something else in time and space. In a film, the moment of the
haircut (or hair transformation) becomes the locus, the space of splitting, the very moment that
the character assumes an image, an identity in relation to a referent (otherness or its look). The
fluidity of identity crystallizes into a pre-given or self-fulfilling position as the haircut forces the
image to assume a position in relation to the demand or desire of the self or another character.
However as Bhabha indicates, this new identity position is never affirmed because the identity of
the character is ignored and established in relation to other characters and the spectator, whose
own identity position is also in flux as it attempts to establish itself in relation to the identification
with and against “an otherness, its look or locus” – the new cinematic image on the screen.

It is in Bhabha’s final condition in the process of identification that Scarry’s
conceptualization of pain (creation/decreation) returns to the argument. The “production of an
image of identity” (creation) is the Opaque Movement of the narrative and the “transformation
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of the subject in assuming that image” (decreation) is the consent of the cinematic image at the
time of the haircut as distinguished by the degrees of pain as witnessed in the Transparent
Violent Moment and Transparent Moderate Moment. For the spectator, the moment of the
haircut can be read with visual and narrative markers. What is notable and important to
distinguish between these two markers is that the one – the body, the hair – can be considered
material – the spectator can see the hair being cut or the transparent physical ramifications of the
haircut (hair transformation); and the other – the belief, the identity – can be considered
immaterial – the spectator must infer and analyze the motivation (consent) behind the haircut –
most often through narrative. My conceptualizations of the Transparent Violent Moment and the
Transparent Moderate Moment and their occurrence within the Opaque Movement reside within
the interplay and movement between the two markers – the material and the immaterial – as
witnessed by the length and amount of hair that is cut and the motivations behind the haircuts and
hair transformations.
In films like Taxi Driver, Fight Club, The Bourne Identity, Waiting to Exhale, Single
White Female, Caged, Full Metal Jacket, White Chicks, Mulan, The Long Kiss Goodnight,
Vertigo, and The Magdalene Sisters, characters undergo drastic haircut changes that I would
classify as the Transparent Violent Moment. In these films, characters shave their heads,
drastically color their hair or get an extreme haircut from long hair to short. For example, in the
film V for Vendetta, the character Evey finds herself being held prisoner and tortured. At one
point during her captivity she is shaved. The image below captures the pain and anguish on her
face as her identity is stripped away. In this film the character moves from a nice and kind woman
who wants to avoid violence towards a nice and kind woman who is able to flip the switch and
commit the violent act of blowing up the Parliament building.
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Figure 5: Still Image of Evey
getting her hair shaved during the
Transparent Violent Moment of V
for Vendetta

On the flip side of the extreme changes to hair is the moderate change in hairstyles and
hair length. In films like Something New, Pretty Woman, Little Mermaid, Desperately Seeking
Susan, Clueless, Sliding Doors, The Mirror has Two Faces, the Lethal Weapon seriesxiii, and
Smoke Signals, characters undergo moderate changes to their hair that I would classify as the
Transparent Moderate Moment. In these films, characters trim, cut, and color their hair however
the changes are moderate. For example in the film Cleo from 5 to 7, Cleo is frustrated with her
existence and being pigeon-holed as a diva. In a telling scene, captured in the images below, Cleo
strips from her hair a clip of additional hair. With the removal of this extra hair, Cleo liberates
herself and begins a journey of introspection that culminates in her willingness to confront her
cancer head on.

Figure 6: Still Images
of Cleo: a. Before, b.
During, and c. After
the Transparent
Moderate Moment in
Cleo from 5 to 7

a.

b.

c.

In The Crying Game, both types of moments occur. In the first haircut of the film, Fergus moves
between a shag hairstyle and a professional look: this would be an example of the Transparent
Violent Moment in that a significant length of hair is cut from the body. In the second haircut,

xiii

The Lethal Weapon series can rightfully be argued as an example of the Transparent Violent Moment. The
difference would be one’s individual reading of the motivation behind the hair transformations.
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Fergus receives a trim at the hands of Dil – the trim cuts off the extra length of hair at the nape of
the neck: given the minimal amount of hair that is cut I would define this second haircut as the
Transparent Moderate Moment. The third hair transformation occurs off-screen as Jude cuts,
colors, and straightens her blonde hair into a red bob – an example of the Transparent Violent
Moment. And finally, Fergus cuts off Dil’s massy, voluminous hair into a short natural afro –
again, the Transparent Violent Moment. Further distinction between the two types of moments
will be made as the motivation behind the haircuts/transformations is discussed below. It should
be noted though, the length of hair being cut cannot be the only distinguishing factor in
determining which Moment a character has experienced, unless it is apparent that a significant
amount of hair is cut, the head is shaved, or a combination of the two is involved. The act of
cutting is only a part of the realignment process; it is the apparent act of decreation of an identity.
Difference in the moments will have to be negotiated and balanced against the motivation – the
intention behind the production/creation of the new identity.

Interrogating the Haircut: Reading the Opaque Movement
As I indicated before, consent is instrumental to understanding and reading the
realignment of the self, of the character’s identity, before and after the moment of the haircut. As
I have shown, hair is the material representation of the self, and as I intend to show the immaterial

...You’d do anything for me?
Anything.
No way.
You said anything Dil.
A girl has to draw the line somewhere.
Want to change you into a man.
Why?
It’s a secret.
Would you like me better that way Jimmy?
Yes.
And you wouldn’t leave me?
No.
Do you promise?
I promise.
Go on then.
from The Crying Game (1992)
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representation of a character’s pre-given identity or self-fulfilling prophecy is linked to the choice
of hairstyle that results from the haircut/transformation. The lines of dialogue above will allow
me to explore consent and give voice to the immaterial importance of hair in the representation of
identity.

The aforementioned lines of dialogue precede the scene in which Fergus cuts Dil’s hair
into a short afro. At the heart this dialogue is that the matter of consent that can be witnessed as
either psychological warfare or torture. Scarry argues “the difference between the two models
[war and torture] is this: in one the belief belongs to the person whose body is used in its
confirmation; in the other, the belief belongs to a person other than the person whose body is used
to confirm it” (149). To explain her argument further, consent requires the acceptance of fictitious
belief systems: in war the system is “not yet real” while in torture the system is “unreal”. Further,
in war, the body/belief of the loser gives consent or acceptance of the winner’s belief system if
they lose in battle: if not mine than yours. On the other hand, torture forces one to accept
something that they did not believe in the first place by inflicting pain upon the body: not yours
only mine.
What is important to note in this is the presence of the body and the belief in the act. As
we look at the lines of dialogue above, it is important to notice the bodies present. The body or
bodies involved in the act can help point to a distinction between psychological war and torture.
Two or more bodies may initially point towards warfare, though as Scarry notes, if it becomes
apparent that the body of the one being cut no longer consents to the transformation at the
hands/words of the others, then warfare has moved to torture. Torture can occur between two or
more people. Complications between psychological warfare and torture can arise when the
engagement is between one person and their own ideological belief system or an institution (e.g.
government/military as seen in G.I. Jane) outside of themselves.
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Fergus and Dil’s exchange above is an example of psychological warfare, the tension
between the demand and the desire of self versus the other. Their engagement resulted in an
identity with a motivation and belief system that could be classified as “if not mine, than yours.”
Their battle, and her surrender to him, resulted in a consensual acceptance of a belief system and
identity that ‘was not yet real.” If the creation of a new cinematic image – Dil as Jody in his
cricket whites – resulted in the decreation of Dil as woman at the moment of the haircut as shown
in the dialogue above when Dil surrenders, then the process of identification began much earlier
in the film. The motivation for Fergus’s actions lie within the narrative and requires the spectator
to look back at the previous images to find referents and infer the importance of those images in
shaping the belief system of the body conferring its beliefs (Fergus) onto the body being
confirmed (Dil). As I indicated before, the motivation resides within the Opaque Movement of
the film which begins the moment the first character enters the narrative to the last moment a
character leaves the narrative; thus, the motivation will have to be examined throughout the
narrative even though the dialogue above crystallizes the instance of the Transparent Violent
Moment.
To begin looking at the motivation for the cut, let us begin with the resulting identity
created, hailed into existence. The new cinematic image (identity) – Dil as Jody in his cricket
whites – finds its otherness, locus, look not only in a photograph, but also in a dream-image and a
ghostly apparition of Jody in his cricket whites. The photograph is an object external to Fergus’s
body; the dream-image exists within Fergus’s consciousness and is thus a part of his body. Thus,
the ghostly or dream-image of Jody has significant import in understanding a portion of Fergus’s
motivation. By stating this, I disagree with Scarry who states “That is, the particular content of
the dream images (now terrifying, now benign; now full of uncanny secret intelligence about the
sleeper, now ignorant, arbitrary, and nonsensical) is itself insignificant beside the overall fact of
the dreaming itself, the emergency work of the imagination to provide an object – this object, that
object, any object – to sustain and to exercise the capacity for self-objectification during the
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sleep-filled hours of sweet and dangerous bodily absorption” (167). While the dream-image of
Jody can be read as “any object” by Scarry’s definition, the cutting of Dil’s hair is more than an
act of the imagination in creating any object, but a real act of creating a real object. As Fergus
states to Dil, that real object is the creation of a man (Want to change you into a man). Thus the
process of haircutting is a process of gendering (maning) a previously female body into a male
body. To echo Dil, why? The answer lies in the word “secret” in Fergus’s subsequent line of
dialogue.
As I indicated before, the embargo of the press to not disclose the “secret” of The Crying
Game, stresses the importance of the “reveal” of the film which hinges on the infliction of
psychological pain upon the spectator. Given that the pain inflicted upon the spectator and Fergus
is rooted in the preconceived notion of Dil’s gender as female, the motivation for the haircut can
be read as a means of trying to protect Dil - a rather chauvinistic motivation, but a motivation
nonetheless. However this motivation only works if the spectator and Fergus feel and believe that
Dil is indeed a “woman” that needs the protection of a man.
Now if we follow Fergus’s line of thinking (“you’d do anything for me”) and agree that
Dil has now been ‘maned’ with the cutting of her hair into a short afro for her own protection, it
must be stated that the body that is protected or saved is not Dil, but Fergus; for the resulting
cinematic image – Dil as Jody in his cricket whites – possesses an identity that protects and kills
for Fergus. What does this mean than for the masculinity of Fergus given that he decreated a
woman to create a man to ‘save’ him from participating in a scheme he feared? Now, even if
there is no agreement that Fergus’s masculinity is now in question, it should be apparent that the
motivation, the belief, the why of the haircut still resides in the “secret” that Fergus states openly.
Since we are talking about psychological warfare and torture, could the motivation exist in a form
of self-torture within Fergus’s consciousness? The warfare is shown in the dialogue, acted out
with the scissors operating as a weapon in their battle, and is clearly evidenced by Dil conceding
to Fergus, but could it be that Fergus himself is unaware of the secret motivation for his actions?
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If, as Scarry indicates, torture is the attempt to get the body of the other to believe something that
is unreal, could Fergus not be the body conferring the belief and the body being conferred? If that
is the case, would Fergus’s motivation reside in his attempt to get himself to believe something
that has been unreal to him, maybe some objectless referent that has been causing him
psychological pain that needs to be eliminated? Could the answer lie in Fergus’s visual
consumption of an image that produced disgust and caused him to vomit – the secret/reveal of the
film? Could it be that the motivation for the haircut resides in the consumption of an irredeemable
image, an image of excess visibility of a ‘woman who has sex organs more or less everywhere’?
If this is indeed the case, could this image – woman with a penis (which exists in a state of
objectlessness given the cinematic image is projected and not actually material existence) – this
secret of the film, not be situated as a motivating force in his behavior? If this is the case, then, as
Marriot suggests, Fergus was simply trying to defend himself from the consumption of an
irredeemable image that caused him disgust. In this case, the ‘fear-and-object’ image that he
consumed was not the image of the penis itself as object, as the penis itself did not disgust Fergus
nor warrant a defense against pain – he had previously held Jody’s penis and he had received
fellatio. Thus the pain inflicted must have come from the fear of seeing an image that was not
previously consumed and internalized within his consciousness – the (cinematic) image of a
woman with a penis – and initially became the source of his objectless fear. However, once the
cinematic image was consumed and internalized into an object, it was no longer an objectless
fear, but an image that induced the pain associated with its new state as ‘fear-and-object.’
Therefore, if the new ‘fear-and-object’ is the previously objectless fear associated with an image
of a woman with a penis, then this new ‘fear-and-object’ was the source of Fergus’s disgust, and
it would need to be eliminated. As such, Fergus needed a defense, a mechanism to alleviate the
pain. He needed to cut Dil’s hair and realign her into a more palatable and consumable image that
he could look at again and again and reestablish his aestheticization without pain – Jody in his
cricket whites.
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What is important to note is that if Fergus was engaged in self-torture then he was forcing
himself to accept something that was unreal to him. If that is the case, then Fergus’s identity also
shifted. The cutting of the hair not only realigned Dil into an object that existed within his
imagination, but Fergus’s identity was also shifted in the process. What could Fergus’s new
identity be realigned to? If haircutting is indeed an act of gendering (maning, womaning, or
creating some other body in transition) and a shifting of the character’s identity, does the body
cutting the hair experience a gendering of the self as well? If Dil was maned at the time of the
haircut with an identity that followed preconceived notions of masculinity – protector and killer –
then was Fergus womaned at that very moment as well? Did the haircut realign the perceived
symbol of power – the penis – from Fergus to Dil? If the haircut indicates and reaffirms the
fluidity of identity as argued, could it not be argued that Fergus became a woman
confined/imprisoned to a gender role that is traditionally read as sacrificial; a gender role that
robs the individual of freedom and power; a gender role that deprives the individual of sexual
choice?
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Fergus – Performing the Heterosexual White Man
Chapter 2
“Hugh Grant epitomizes a masculinity which has adopted the social tactics of niceness, compliance and liberal tolerance in
response to the rising aspirations and assertiveness of women. Both in his public persona and his fictional character of Charles
[from Four Weddings and a Funeral], his hesitant speech and self-effacement appear to leave him incapable of asserting himself.
But this foppish play-acting is designed to preserve his narcissism.”
―Jonathan Rutherford, Forever England: Reflections of Masculinity and Empire

For most criticsxiv and spectators, the character of Fergus in the 1992 Neil Jordan film, The
Crying Game, has been read as firmly heterosexual or heterosexual with homoerotic overtones. I
question the validity of this assertion and propose a reading of Fergus’s performance as a
character in the process of discovering who he is sexually and racially. Beyond, race and gender,
what other identity characteristics is Fergus attempting to discover? What other processes of selfdiscovery and performance are spectators resisting or accepting as they view and read his
character? What are the visual markers for reading changes in Fergus’s identity performance
within the film? In this chapter I propose the visual markers for reading fluidity in Fergus’s
identity performance can be attributed in part to the cutting/transforming of a character’s hair. By
arguing that the two haircuts Fergus gets during the film represent not only visual changes to the
character, I will argue that they are moments of identity realignment. In arguing this, it is my goal
to enrich the theoretical concepts―Transparent Violent Moment and the Transparent Moderate
Moment and their occurrence within the Opaque Movement of the narrative―I introduced in an
earlier chapter. To begin, let us first mark the instant that the Opaque Movement begins within
the narrative. The Opaque Movement begins the instant the first image of a human enters the film
and provides the spectator with an unconscious method of determining what a sexed body will

xiv

Handler, Grist, Lockett, Giles, Jordan, Backus and Doan to name a few operate under the assumption that Fergus is
genuinely heterosexual though they do concede he does manifest homosexual tendencies.
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look like within the film. With this shot we, as spectators, are given a sequence that establishes
the representations of gendered, sexualized, and racialized hair that we will use to establish
narrative reference as to what a racialized and gendered (sex and sexuality is usually implicated
through gender) body will look like within the narrative whether we are conscious of this fact or
not.
The Crying Game opens with a tracking shot from right to left underneath a bridge near
Laytown in County Meade. In the background, a carnival/fairground can be seen. While there are
images of people moving along the shore, the indistinct appearance of the characters does not
clue the spectator as to the types of people that are going to be represented in the narrative. From
beneath the bridge, the film cuts to a close up of speakers that are projecting the previously nondiegetic music, thus suturing the music to the narrative. The camera then pulls back from the
speakers and fills the screen with representations of various background characters. This shot
begins the Opaque Movement in The Crying Game.
As the camera moves through the fair, the various background characters – men, women,
and children – can be seen with different styles of dress, different complexions, and different
hairstyles. There are images of women with long, short, red, blonde, and brunette or brown hair.
There are images of men with blond, brown, short, long, and unfortunately, mullets. As I argued
earlier, while clothing can be used to distinguish the perceived gender of a character within the
space of a film, I think it is the hair of the character that gives the spectator a visual referent as to
the gender (sex and sexuality is implicated), race, and ethnicity of a character.xv
The Opaque Movement also provides a type of cinematic mirror for spectators to view
themselves in and against to assure themselves that they have ‘maned’ or ‘womaned’ themselves
accordingly. Complications surrounding gender/sex identity occur within this opening sequence
as shown in the following image.
xv

In his work Welcome to the Jungle, Kobena Mercer argues that skin is the preferred marker for racial identification.
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Figure 7: Still Image of
Fergus from The Crying
Game. Fergus is standing
back to back against an
image of a previously
“identified” woman. The
shot depicts an overlay or a
possible suturing of Fergus
with this other character
through hair and dress

At the foreground is Fergus, to his immediate right is an individual with a similar
hairstyle also dressed in black (an earlier shot pointed towards a female face), and in the
background right two individuals (previously shown as male) display similar dress with hairstyles
that blur the gender line. In these images, black clothing and long hairstyles point to similar
bodies – possibly characters on the fringe of society. Given that the still image shown depicts the
character of Fergus back-to-back with the female body, an allusion can be made that the two are
mirror images of each other. To go further, the overlap of the two cinematic images, both dressed
in black, appear sutured to one another as if they were the same body – both male and female.
In this fairground setting with its population of various image representations, the
spectator is shown the ‘look’, the movement of the character images. Given the predominance of
white faces, as opposed to the lone black face in this sequence, it appears that the film is going to
be a white film with dark overtones. Further, with the overwhelming presence of white faces in
this opening sequence, the spectator is shown what it means to be and look white, and presumably
straight. Wheeler Winston Dixon argues that
…all social mass communication is heterosexually privileged; the arbiters of public
discourse assume they are speaking to a straight audience. Thus straightness
becomes the normative system of values for the dominant social discourse, just as
whiteness is seen as the ‘majority’ and all other ethnicities make up the ‘minorities.’
But just like whiteness, straightness is a construct, something that doesn’t really
exist, a concept that needs constant reaffirmation to keep it from disappearing.
(Dixon 1)
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If, as Dixon suggests, whiteness and straightness (heterosexuality) require constant reaffirmation,
cinema offers the venue for constant performance within a medium that can be viewed and reviewed and thus maintain a level of existence through persistence. Gwendolyn Audrey Foster
corroborates Dixon and this assessment of film when she states,
…the performance of whiteness in moving images. The performance of whiteness
in cinema may be viewed as a sort of cultural, repetitive dis-ease, a place where we
can return to the repressed, the disordered, and the destabilized; whether that be
whiteness, class, or compulsory heterosexuality, the cinema is a factory of identity
performances. It is the garment center of white fabrication. The cinema has been
remarkably successful at imposing whiteness as a cultural norm, even as it exposes
the inherent instability of such arguably artificial binaries as male/female,
white/black, heterosexual/homosexual, classed/not classed. It is as though the
cinema has sought to hold up these binaries with an almost unrelenting fervor that
insists on the definition of the body through performance. (Foster 2)

For both Dixon and Foster, cinema provides the system for spectator self-identification. In her
theoretical examination of whiteness, Foster introduces a term called white space to describe the
narrative space where identity is formed. I will extend her concept as a component of the Opaque
Movement as she argues “white space [is] a post-modern concept of on-screen space where
identity is negotiated, mutable, and transitory” (Foster 3). For the purposes of the Opaque
Movement, the identity being ‘negotiated, mutable, and transitory’ applies to both the characters
within the on-screen space (narrative) and the spectator reading the film. Formulating an identity
whether it is the identity of a character or a spectator’s self-identity is a fluid interchange within
and apart from this white space as spectators identify or resist identification with characters
viewed throughout the Opaque Movement of film.
Spectators who accept the heterosexually privileged and white discourse of a film as a
given reinforce Dixon’s assertion of their minority or privileged status. Resistance to this
cinematic discourse requires a conscious sidestepping of the discourse of the spectator by not
accepting the cinematic images or performances of identity fabrication (white and straight) as the
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norm in a binary discussion. In his article “Black Spectatorship: Problems of Identification and
Resistance,” Manthia Diawara develops the “notion of the resisting spectator” (Braudy and
Cohen 892) as a challenge to traditional notions of spectator identification that don’t account for
the black spectator viewing and not identifying with their like on the screen. By adopting his
concept of resisting spectatorship, it is my goal in part to enhance his argument by extending the
notion of the resisting spectator to all spectators who don’t identify with their representation on
the screen. In assuming this position, I am giving voice to Diawara’s argument that “resisting
spectators are transforming the problem of passive identification into active criticism which both
informs and interrelates with contemporary oppositional film making” (Braudy and Cohen 900).
The resisting spectator who resists identification with their cinematic representation on the
screen, regardless of race, sex, gender, sexuality, begins to examine the film within the white
space created by the narrative instead of identifying with the preconceptions and normative
identifications associated with a given cinematic image apart from the narrative. For example, if
one were to accept a queer position for the film as the norm—that is a minority position for the
narrative discourse—what identity does the spectator afford himself or herself when minority no
longer applies to the spectator? I ask this question for it is within and apart from this white space
of The Crying Game that Fergus performs whiteness and heterosexuality.
If as Dixon suggests, the concepts of whiteness and heterosexuality require constant
reaffirmation or else they disappear, what are the performative qualities that need to be repeated?
And if these qualities or characteristics are absent, is the film advocating an alternative or queer
discourse? If so, then it stands to reason that the spectator is imbuing the white space of the film
with external discourse apart from the narrative in order to affirm their external identification as
majority, minority or Other. When discussing the concepts of whiteness and heterosexuality or
masculinity of men, and more specifically the British or English male—which I am going to
extend to the character of Fergus as a member of the United Kingdom—the concepts of
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masculinity, heterosexuality and whiteness have been defined in terms of the male body’s
relationship with mothers, nation, violence, marriage, work, husbandry, fatherhood, sexuality, and
patriarchy, among other concepts (Hearn and Pringle 2006; Spicer 2001; Neal 2008; Rutherford
1997). It is the depiction of those relationships in film, literature, history, politics, and culture that
man is defined as a masculine, heterosexual, white, and male. If it is through the relationships
between the male body and these concepts that man is established as white heterosexual male,
how does the absence of a majority of these relationships from The Crying Game allow for the
definition of Fergus to be identified as heterosexual and white?
I acknowledge that Fergus brandishes a gun and as a volunteer of the IRA group that
kidnaps Jody, Fergus displays aggressive moments; further, the film itself contains some rather
violent scenes, however, the film makes a conscious choice to distinguish Fergus as someone
different than these other violent characters. At the beginning of the narrative, Fergus has no job,
no marriage, is not a husband or father, and does not discuss a relationship with his parents. So I
ask, what are the performative acts within the film that constitute his whiteness or
heterosexuality? At the beginning of the film, Fergus is characterized much as the way Hugh
Grant is characterized in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter – nice, compliant, foppish,
and liberally tolerant of others. He is the new British male. However that reading of the character
is externally leveled against the character. For in actuality he is but a body in the countryside.xvi
When describing Grant’s character Charles in Four Weddings and a Funeral, Rutherford could be
describing Fergus in the film:
What he desires to emulate is the antithesis of the English heterosexual
manliness he aspires to. He gives expression to that recurring difficulty of upper
and middle class, heterosexual Englishmen – loving women….But the film’s
representation of homosexual love as something lost suggests that Charles must

xvi

As will be discussed later, Fergus does kiss Jude while they are out in the country, however the kiss itself does not
imply a relationship beyond what could be seen as affection between brothers-at-arms. This sexual act will have to be
weighed against the act of holding Jody’s penis to determine the status of Fergus’s sexual identity. The measures, and
value of those acts, are determined by the spectator identifying with, or not, the character on the screen.
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renounce the homoerotic origins of his desire. He succeeds in securing a woman
through the efficacy of sensitivity and niceness. But the doubt remains that what
he was loving was more his own desire (for himself, for other men) than a
woman. (Rutherford 141)

Most readings of Fergus concur with the sensitivity, niceness, and liberal tolerance of the
character, but again, those are external readings of a character within the white space of The
Crying Game. My proposed reading of the character argues that the moments of performance that
reaffirm whiteness and straightness and serve to stabilize the binaries of male/female,
white/black, and heterosexual/homosexual occur after the character gets his two haircuts.
The first haircut that Fergus obtains is off-screen and is an example of the concept I call
the Transparent Violent Moment because the character cuts a substantial amount of hair when he
moves from a shag hairstyle to a more professional short cut reminiscent of Peter’s hairstyle.
Prior to his haircut, Fergus’s initial Irish identity is meek and feminine. He is friendly. He is kind.
He is childlike in his actions when he and Jody run through the woods. He is reticent to
participate in the torture of Jody, despite his role in capturing him. He is controlled by Jody. He is
a beta male to Peter whom he has to ask permission for his actions. He is not comfortable being in
possession of the pistol, of power – “should we regard the pistol as symbolizing the phallus – of
sufficiency and lack” (9) as Leighton Grist suggests in his reading of the film. He is an equal to
Jude in her motherly attributes (she gets them tea, he feeds Jody). He holds Jody’s penis. He finds
pleasure in caring for Jody’s penis. He is sexually ambiguous. In Peter’s words, “You’re a good
man Fergus” (Jordan 201).
This initial identity is represented in his shoulder length hair that mimicked the shoulder
length hair seen on the female body shown in the still image earlier. It is this identity that Fergus
wants to negotiate, mutate, and transform. For the spectator, the narrative clues that Fergus’s
identity is in flux occurs in the following exchange of dialogue:
Tommy: So what do you need Fergus?
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Fergus: Need to go across the water.
Tommy: Do you now?
Fergus: Need to lose myself awhile. (Jordan 206)

These phrases are the narrative markers in the text that indicate a makeover moment or a
transformation to his identity is about to occur. These statements clearly mark his consent to
engage in the transformative act. While the statement (“Need to lose myself awhile.”) does not
occur within a framework of psychological warfare with another character or institution, it does
indicate that Fergus is consenting to give up, to lose his identity to something else. This statement
can be read as an example of psychological self-torture namely because the unspoken pronoun ‘I’
is so pronounced in the desire for transformation.
The actual haircut occurs off screen, however the new image representation of Fergus
that the spectator sees following those narrative clues is evidence that a physical transformation
has occurred; thus, it should be apparent to the spectator that an internal transformation to the
character has also occurred. As I argued earlier, the initial character of Fergus exists within a
space in the narrative in which his identity has no reference to the characteristics normally
associated with defining the white heterosexual male. As a result of the Transparent Violent
Momentxvii , it is as if this ambiguous character identity is laid to rest and a new identity is born,
an identity born within and against some of the aforementioned criteria – first up, work.

xvii

During a makeover moment – Transparent Violent Moment (TVM) or Transparent Moderate Moment (TMM) – the
amount of hair being cut off distinguishes between the two, as does the level of motivation behind the cut. As I argued
earlier, within the TVM characters shave their heads, drastically color their hair or get an extreme hair cut from long
hair to short. In her article, “Hair without a head: disembodiment and the uncanny,” Janice Miller says of hair: “To
leave the body, to be cut off, to fall out, to be separate is for hair to reveal its marginality; to be come alienated from its
‘natural’ bodily context and hence to become menacing.” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 185). I concur with Miller that the
removal or cutting of hair, especially significant or even medium lengths, can menace both the spectator and the
character within the narrative. To menace is to show or represent a threat or to inflict harm; to evoke Elaine Scarry – to
menace is to cause psychological pain upon the character or the spectator. Given that hair is dead physically,
metaphorically the symbolism of hair and its ability to register gender, sex or race is profound. The more hair that is cut
or transformed, the greater the menacing threat to the psychic register of the character or the spectator in their ability to
define or redefine, and thus identify or unidentify with, the image before them, especially when the amount of hair
being cut off challenges the ability to gender-identify the image. The menace, threat, or effect of psychological pain
diminishes with the presence of a narrative visual referent that can suture the narrative and thus alleviate the pain
caused by having to search for a referent in the first place.
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As a character, Fergus’s performance of whiteness is recognized by the white face he
sports immediately after he has undergone the Transparent Violent Moment off-screen. Amy
Zillax contends in her reading of Fergus that—
…race is often produced as a similar kind of masquerade….Fergus’s whiteness
is…figured as literally whiteface, a thick coating of pale dust, which has settled
on his face and body at the construction site where he works. This figuration
can be seen to describe race as both radically external to the subject—literally a
deposit on the skin, rather than the psyche—and, in that way, as analogous to
gender: like Dil, Fergus is just “a bit heavy on the powder.” (Zillax 33)

While Zillax essentially argues that race is a façade of the skin, as evidenced by the white
powder, Foster argues that whiteface is not blackface—a possible description of the white
powder—but rather it is a form of ethnic passing. Whiteface “involves performing whiteness in
such a way that traces of ethnicity are erased. Whiteface defines the cinematic landscape as a
white space. Blackface made a safe place for black minstrelsy within white cinematic space,” she
argues (Foster 47). Further, Foster says “when I use the term whiteface, I do not mean the
opposite of blackface. I regard whiteface as a space where representation that demands classpassing, class othering, giving up ethnic identity to become white, and insists that the human race,
especially in Americaxviii is white” (51). To concur with Zillax, the white face (powder) that the
spectator sees on Fergus is an indication that performance of whiteness is occurring. Additionally,
the fact that Fergus is now performing manual labor at a construction site should clue the
spectator that he is attempting to reconstruct his identity. In his reading of the film, John Hill
states that “a number of scenes take place in this location, a symbolically useful place of
reconstruction, in which the holes in the walls have not yet been filled up…boundaries are
marked, but they can change, people can see through them, penetrate them – cross over them”
(95). Thus, though Fergus has attempted to lose himself by creating a new identity for himself in

xviii

Though Foster argues for whiteface as a form of ethnic erasing in America. I am extending her concept to England
via her use of cinema as the medium for transmitting the concept of whiteface as cinema is a medium produced in other
countries beyond America.
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Britain, this new identity is not stable and in fact will come crashing down around him, much like
the windowpane that he shatters, when he creates the Transparent Violent Moment of Dil. For
now though, we can read Fergus’ identity as a performance of white.
Foster says that whiteface is expected of immigrants, both on- and off-screen. Fergus’s
immigration to Britain results in his attempt to hide his class, his nationality, his ‘identity’
through this new representation. While getting his haircut for the second time by Dil in her salon,
Fergus shows his performance of whiteface during the following exchange:
Fergus, sitting up. She begins to cut.
Dil: You American?
Fergus: No.
Dil: Not English.
Fergus: No.
Dil: Scottish?
Fergus: How’d you guess?
Dil: The accent, I suppose. (Jordan 209)

Foster says that to perform whiteness, “whiteface demands that class markers and ethnic markers
be erased…One must give up all claims of ethnicity to be properly white” (51). Fergus’s
assumption of a Scottish identity and name change illustrate his attempt to transform his identity.
The name change, the class change from IRA volunteer to laborer, and ethnic change from Irish
to Scottish illustrate Fergus’s performance of whiteness as a result of the Transparent Violent
Moment, but what about his performance as heterosexual?
Let us ask first, what is heterosexuality? Jonathan Katz says the term “heterosexual was
not equated here with normal sex, but with perversion – a definitional tradition that lasted in the
middle-class culture into the 1920s. Kiernan linked heterosexual to one of several ‘abnormal
manifestations of the sexual appetite” (19-20). In these first years of defining heterosexuality, its
deviance and abnormal qualities became subsumed by theories of nationalism and respectability
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and shaped into the standard of acceptable normal behavior for middle-class society.xix In her
theorizing of heterosexuality, Diane Richardson argues, “the experience of institutionalized
heterosexuality is also informed by, and informs, constructions of race and class” (2). Further, she
states that “we [spectators] tend to assume that ‘”whiteness” figures the normative center of
political and theoretical discussions about sexuality and identity” (2). In his reading of the film,
Christopher Lockett says, “the subversive quality of the film lies not in the revelatory nature of a
sudden sexual switch, but in the way a performative sexuality gets played out against an ingrained
and fundamentally gendered nationalist tradition” (294).
Taking all of these conceptualizations of heterosexuality as whole is important to
understanding the performance of sexuality that takes place after Fergus gets his hair trimmed by
Dil which is the visual representation of the Transparent Moderate Moment (See image below).

Figure 8: Still Image of
Fergus getting a haircut
during the Transparent
Moderate Moment at the
hands of Dil

First, if heterosexuality is tied to issues of race, nation, and class, then it stands to reason, one
could argue that Fergus may have initially been straight when he held an Irish identity, however
after the first haircut, he chose to pass himself off as Scottish and with it, strip himself of an
ethnic identity and as a citizen of his nation, and with it, the implicit association of
heterosexuality and national identity as Irish. Richardson argues, “claims to citizenship status, at
least in the West, are closely associated with the institutionalisation [sic] of heterosexual as well
xix

See George L. Mosse’s exceptional work, Nationalism & Sexuality: Respectability & Abnormal Sexuality in
Modern Europe, for insight on how the theories of nationalism and respectability operate to control and contain the
minds of middle class culture and create the current understandings of normal behaviors and sexuality in all of society.
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as male privilege….If we take citizenship to mean national identity, for example, it would appear
that in many if not most nation-states this form of citizenship is equated with a naturalized
heterosexuality” (16). Thus, as Fergus performs whiteness (i.e. ethnic passing) does he not have
to pass himself off as heterosexual since he is not in actuality a citizen of any given nation-state?
Despite critical and spectatorial assumptions of Fergus’s heterosexuality, doubt is clearly
present. Stephen Rea says of his character, “It was very clever of Neil to maintain the ambiguity
of the relationship between Fergus and Dil. I mean, Fergus is definitely heterosexual, that’s why
he had the relationship with Miranda (Richardson). I remember at the time, Neil saying ‘I don’t
know if we need to have this scene outside with Miranda’, and I said ‘You’ve got to see him kiss
her, because you’ve got to be sure that he’s heterosexual” (Zucker 114). He continues, “But I
think it is an ambiguous relationship between Fergus and Dil, and deliberately so. After he knows
that Dil is a man, they never consummate the relationship. They kiss, but it’s never actually
consummated. That’s Neil’s way of avoiding the potential prurience and squalor of it. But, when
he kisses Miranda, it’s definitely in the audience’s mind that they’re lovers…Fergus is completely
naïve” (Zucker 114). I would argue so is Rea of this situation. If a kiss by Jude solidifies his
heterosexuality, what does fellatio by Dil solidify? Which act is more straight – a kiss or a blow
job? Or are we to assume that a kiss is more than a kiss for white men, while receiving fellatio
from another man, is what, just par for the course of white male privilege? Further what does the
possible post-coital cigarette in the ‘honeymoon’ suite signify if not consummation of a
relationship?xx
The initial reading of Fergus as strictly heterosexual only works on the spectator who
identifies as heterosexual during the first, initial viewing of the film. Any secondary viewings of
the film are automatically colored by the specter of the penis in the Fergus/Dil relationship. Thus,
xx

Leighton Grist makes a similar reading of this scene when he says “Fergus in addition takes the transformed Dil to a
hotel for what he dubs ‘a honeymoon,’ whereupon an eliding straight cut takes us from the hotel’s exterior to a shot of
Fergus lying on a double bed, under whose covers Dil sleeps while Fergus smokes what might be construed as a
‘postsex’ cigarette” (6).
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the kiss between Fergus and Jude contains as much passion as a chaste kiss between brothers-inarms. Jude and Jody’s kiss—make-out session—contains more passion and heat despite Jude’s
apparent distaste for the encounter. And why is this? Does the encounter between Jude and Jody
have a threat of consummation between a black man and a white woman? Does the true
heterosexuality of the film only showcase itself in this scene between black man and white
woman? Is Georgia Brown correct when she states that “But only in the opening scene, when
drunken Jody drapes himself around the blond Jude…was I conscious of him as a black man”
(Village Voice vol. 37). Wouldn’t this assumption then make the image representation of the
black man inherently heterosexual and not the white man? Rea’s and the spectator’s identification
with the representation of Fergus as heterosexual lies not with the kiss, but with their own
positionality as heterosexual white male or minority apart from the whitespace of the narrative.
So I ask, why are these acts of consummation so important?
Derek Neal argues that “without sex [acts], gender threatens to float away from the
individual, to become completely social and exteriorized phenomenon. Yet, gender, even in its
most plastic or ‘performative’ formulations, makes no sense without reference to sex” (124-125).
Further, “The body conveyed masculinity also, both to society and to the self, through its
function, what it did. Sexual acts were only the most specially charged of such functions.
Together, form and function spoke back to the self, creating an embodied subjectivity” (Neal
125). Thus, the sexual acts serve as an anchor for the characters and the spectators to formulate a
sense of identity about and against the character as heterosexual white male. Implicit in this
identification, and pointed out by Neal, is the presence of the body, the biology of the character.
With that, one must ask if heterosexuality is essentially linked to the presence of the penis,
wouldn’t the presence of a penis on a woman not imply heterosexuality of that character? Or is
heterosexuality only ascribed to a white penis?
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Fergus decision to enter the salon and have his hair trimmed is evidence of his consent to
be recreated. This haircut, this trimming of his hair, is a moderate transformation of self: the
Transparent Violent Moment has already occurred and now, Fergus is simply trimming off the
rough edges in his previous creation. Thus, the Transparent Moderate Moment is a scene that
shows his submission to the hands of the other and to the power of heterosexuality. The trimming
of his hair at this point enables Fergus to remove the discomfort still implicated in his hair and
thus shed off the tail of homosexual overtones and produce a haircut that will allow Fergus to
enter the realm of heterosexuality, of acceptability, of sameness, of commonality as perceived by
the world around him. Elaine Scarry states that in “benign forms of creation, a bodily attribute is
projected into the artifactxxi (a fiction, a made thing), which essentially takes over the work of the
body, thereby freeing the embodied person of discomfort and thus enabling him to enter a larger
realm of self-extension” (144). Cutting off this last portion of hair is mandatory for the character
to identify his self as straight. Dixon states, “performing straightness entails rigid self-discipline.

xxi

For Scarry, “certain words—such as ‘produce,’ ‘body,’ ‘project,’ ‘artifact’—are common to the description of both
[war and torture], it may seem that the two are less radically antithetical than they are. But the overlapping vocabulary
is itself the sign of how absolute the difference is between them, for they share the same pieces of language only
because the one is a deconstruction of the other, a reversal of the path of creation to decreation.” (Scarry 145.) In the
Opaque Movement, hair is the artifact of the cinematic image (body) in question. The two terms become the
overlapping link between the cinematic image and the spectator who recognizes their hair or body type and thus allows
them to identify or unidentify, thus confirming their ‘maned’ or ‘womaned’ existence. The terms ‘produce’ and
‘project’ become integral to understanding the difference between war and torture as determined by the consent of the
individual to receive a hair cut or experience a transformation to their hair. Pain is integral to distinguishing between
war and torture. Scarry is indicating that in war (a ‘benign form of creation’), an external object is being created to
alleviate the pain experienced by the body. In torture, the destruction of that external object—artifact—is being used to
inflict pain. Now if hair on the body is the artifact and the creation or use of a hairstyle is used to alleviate the pain
associated with the constant immaterial reproduction of gender, sex, sexuality, and race, to cut, shave, or transform hair
is to deconstruct the immaterial significance of the hairstyle (i.e. the race, sex, sexuality, or gender of the body). To
echo Scarry, to assume that war is better than torture is to miss the significance of creation and decreation in both war
and torture, for in both, the attributes of the hurt body are projected into the creation of a hairstyle meant to represent
the immaterial and thus alleviate the body of pain associated with defining or performing the immaterial. In creating
any given hairstyle, “pain is deconstructed and displaced by the artifact; in the other, the artifact is deconstructed to
produce pain.” (Scarry 145). In light of this, consent takes on significant import in that torture is forceful (and at other
times willful, implying the self) deconstruction of a hairstyle in order to inflict pain upon the body and thus call into
question the immaterial beliefs of the body. I would argue that a benign form of creation of an artifact that doesn’t
significantly challenge the immaterial beliefs of the body and ‘essentially takes over the work of the body’ allows the
embodied individual to remain in the ‘larger realm of self-extension’ or preconceived social notions of gender and
racial definitions. A moderate transformation to the hair of a cinematic image is thus a benign form of creation of an
artifact (hairstyle) on the body (cinematic image) and therefore doesn’t significantly challenge the embodied individual
to give up the larger realm of self-extension or identification. By contrast, a violent transformation to the hair of a
cinematic image produces a level of pain that alters and challenges the immaterial beliefs of the body. It should be
noticed that the length of hair being cut is only a component of the creation of the new artifact, it is also the effect of
the artifact on the body that must be considered.
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It is a state of monotony, repetition, and predictability” (8). He continues with a list of ‘acts’ that
a straight man must perform in order to affirm his straightness; acts such as play sports (Fergus
plays cricket), be upwardly mobile, wear a tie,
1.

work, and “straight men must always make
2.

aggressive and suggestive comments to and/or
about women [cat calls towards Dil], who are
expected to view this attention as both expected
and desired. Straight men objectify women;

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

straight women expect them to do it” (Dixon 8). In
the sidebar, I offer a list of performative acts that

9.
10.

can be read as a checklist affirming Fergus’s
heterosexuality and through implication,
whiteness and masculinity.

11.
12.
13.

Fergus’s narrative transformation

14.

throughout the Opaque Movement is not
becoming more likeable, displaying kindliness to
others, granting acceptance of blacks, queers, or
appearing more gentlemanly, as he leads the
audience on a quest of gender and sexual
acceptance of the Other. His movement through
the two makeover moments opens up his veneer of
heterosexuality and allows him to enter his own

15.

Fergus new hairstyle mimics Peter’s
hairstyle.
Fergus dresses in black and white – his
clothes mimic Peter’s clothing.
Fergus brings Dil flowers.
Fergus takes Dil out on a date.
Fergus walks Dil home after their dates.
Fergus kisses Dil chastely on the cheek
goodnight.
Fergus stands up to the weaker man –
Dave – to secure his spot at Dil’s side.
Fergus performs sports (specifically
cricket) on the scaffolding at his job site.
Fergus performs manual labor.
Fergus defends the honor of Dil against his
boss in order to show his authority even
though he is in a subjugated position of
employment.
Fergus engages in romantic playful
exchange with Dil.
Fergus receives fellatio from an “inferior”
individual.
Fergus smacks “inferior” individual for
deceiving him.
Fergus apologizes to this “inferior”
individual for assaulting her in order to
keep her “inferior” status in check and
securely in a position that will allow him
to receive fellatio at some future date, if he
so desires.
And the ultimate performative moment,
Fergus prepares to perform heterosexual
sex with Dil. His eyes move down the
body in a requisite manner – devouring the
flesh with his eyes until he comes face to
face with the penis itself and its phallic
representation – “is that what is the source
of his anxiety?” – and he runs off to the
bathroom to vomit. Because that is what
heterosexual men must do when they come
face to face with the penis; they must
disavow it and vomit to secure their
position as heterosexual.

homosexual self. Fergus literally dismantles the
wall of sexual expectations for himself and the viewer. The trouble with this information is that
spectators don’t want to resist identification with Fergus as heterosexual, white male. To do so
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would disrupt their own expectations and ability to describe themselves against the Other. See, a
resisting spectator isn’t simply the individual who is unable to identify with the image presented
before them – be they black or white – on the screen as Diawara theorizes. It also includes the
spectator who is unwilling to resist unidentification with the image before them because said
image provides them a locus for determining their own positionality and subjectivity within and
outside the film.
As I indicated earlier, spectators define themselves within and apart from the white space
of the narrative. Preconceived notions of male and female reside with spectators apart from the
white space of film, which to be fair, reproduces these stereotyped, preconceived notions in order
to affirm and confirm for spectators those very notions of male and female. Hill says that The
Crying Game “represents a demand to live in and with the ‘in-between,’ to resist the rigid
assignation of stereotyped identities inherent in such thinking, identities on which much of our
‘knowledge’ about the world depends” (89). For those who choose not to resist this “knowledge”
of the world, a limited ability to read the film becomes apparent. In the case of Rea, who sees the
image of the white male on the screen and naturally tattoos heterosexuality onto his
representation, it allows him to implicate traditional representations and expectations of
heterosexuality, masculinity, and centrality to his image. As I stated before, this position allows
the spectator and critic to assume a heterosexual male position in order to secure their own
subject position when viewing and reading the film.
The secret of this film works so well because it hinges; no, it prefigures the traditional
notions of male and female and yet disrupts them as seen in the carnival sequence. The secret
works so effectively because film is traditionally read and viewed by spectators from a position
that affords film a heterosexual white male frame of reference. A conscious playing with
spectatorial expectations on the part of Jordan allows for the ‘reveal’ to produce nausea and
disgust for Fergus and the spectator by extension. If the spectator reads the film consciously from
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a subject position outside the traditional white heterosexual male position, they are able to see
that the secret isn’t the reveal of a penis, but a reveal that the authority of privileging white
heterosexuality as the central lens of truth is a falsity. An example of this resisting spectator is
illustrated in the quote by Charles Busch, “peerless New York-based writer and drag actor,” who
states:
I knew in the first scene [that Dil is played by a male actor] but I
couldn’t believe that that was the big surprise everybody was talking
about. It’s no surprise to me that a girl has a dick. So I kept waiting for
the big twist. I thought Miranda Richardson was going to reveal that
she had a dick, too. I mean, there’s a surprise for you. (Handler 36)

So what is it that allowed Busch to resist the machinations of the film that attempted to hide the
truth from the audience? Was it his marginal position as drag performer? Could it be a queerness
about his own body, a queerness of his mind? Could it be his feminine sensibility? Could it be
that the film provided the conscious spectator with various avenues for seeing the truth? Could it
be that he had already digested representational images of a woman with a penis before?
The truth of the matter is that Fergus’s performance of the heterosexual white male could
have continued indefinitely regardless of the presence of the penis on Dil’s body. It isn’t the penis
that produces the third shift in the tone of the film from love story to action film; it is the
reemergence of Jude and Peter that have the more pronounced effect on the identity construction
that Fergus is attempting to forge. Once the two characters return to a central position in the
narrative, Fergus’s performance as heterosexual white male begins to unravel when he cuts Dil’s
hair during the third Transparent Violent Moment in the film.
Up until the moment of Jude and Peter’s reemergence in the narrative, protecting Dil and
making sure that she is taken care of has been Fergus’s prime focus. Dreams of Jody have
occupied his mind: Jody has become Fergus’s man of his dreams, his photographic pin up and for
what purpose? Fergus occupies himself with Jody, whom he derives his power from. The
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photographs allow Fergus to gaze on the image of Jody in order to devour, consume, emulate,
eradicate, and mine the past for phallic strength. Once his past materializes in physical form,
Fergus can no longer draw upon these photographs, these dream representations, these ghostly
apparitions as a power source. He must make the image, the ghost, reappear in material form
again. This is what prompts Fergus to transform Dil.
The deconstruction of Dil as woman, and creation of Dil as man, as something new,
something that nobody recognizes, brings about the destruction of Fergus’s performative identity.
Fergus produces the Transparent Violent Moment after Jude and Peter have told him that he is
going on a suicide mission. The specter of pain from his own physical death forces him to
sacrifice Dil’s hair and identity: the price is his own psychic identity construction and the
acceptance of his homosexual Irish identity, or quite possibly the deconstruction of his identity
has white heterosexual man and the creation of his identity as white heterosexual woman. This
assertion is tied to the aforementioned ‘honeymoon’ suite scene and the image of the sutured
male and female body that share a similarity of dress and hairstyle. As Fergus drastically cuts off
Dil’s hair he is attempting to recreate a representation of a man that appeared only in a
photograph or a dream within this narrative. For Fergus, his goal was to make a real image that
existed in the photographic-dream-image representation of Jude in his cricket whites. There was
no original ‘real’ referent for this image in the narrative only a sign of some ghostly
representation since we never see Jody in this outfit. We only have a photographic/dream-image
representation as evidence of its previous existence. If we accept this new Dil-imagerepresentation of Jody in this outfit to be Jody, we must unconsciously read this image
representation (photograph/dream-image) as real, as once alive, as dead, as a ghost, as wanting to
be recreated, rematerialized.
Fergus cuts Dil’s hair into a short afro and dresses her in the cricket whites once worn by
Jody. His goal is to produce, project, recreate an image representation that he hopes will protect
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and comfort him. Once the haircut is complete and Dil is firmly within her own Transparent
Violent Moment, Fergus’ feminine, motherly, subordinate qualities re-emerge. The scene
between Fergus and Dil in the “honeymoon” suite possibly indicates the post-coital experience:
the man (Dil) spent and asleep and the woman enjoying a cigarette. Further, the scene with the
two individuals in bed could be seen as “a form that inducts Eros into the service of Thanatos by
suggesting that men may only love each other passionately and unreservedly when the threshold
of death is absolutely, 100% definitely about to be crossed” (Backus and Doan 187). Fergus
thought he was about to cross this border into death.
The next night, Fergus confesses his ‘infidelity’ to a drunk Dil in an attempt to seek
forgiveness, or was it to produce anger that Dil would act upon him and protect him from his
fate? It is after he confesses his sins to Dil that he is tied to the bed where he erotically struggles
to free himself and is thus protected from carrying out the mission that claims the life of Peter.
Fergus is unable to save himself, so he has had to produce, create a representation with more
phallic power to destroy his new identity and eliminate his past. After Dil has eliminated his past
by killing Jude, Fergus banishes the representation from reality by sending Dil away. He then
accepts the blame for the murder, the least he can do since the ghostly representation he created
can no longer exist, and goes to prison.
In the end, for the spectator to assume that Fergus is safe from exploring his homosexual
tendencies because he is away from Dil and safe behind bars seems rather naïve. Given Fergus’s
described kindliness, feminine masculinity, and otherwise gentlemanly disposition, it seems
rather naïve to assume that Fergus, suddenly cordoned off from the woman with a penis, could or
would say no to a more dominant male asking for sexual gratification given the situational
homosexuality generated by prison. No, Fergus’s heterosexuality is only a given for the spectator
unable or unwilling to resist the preconceived notion of heterosexuality as stable, fixed, and a
given for white males in film.
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Jude – the Only Woman in the Game
Chapter 3

“Blondness…its distinctive imagery of youth, vitality and wealth, built up over thousands of years, has
woven itself into the most popular material of the imagination. We see it and absorb its messages every
day. Blonde hair is attractive and sexy, and often worn as a trophy. In every popular forum of our age – in
film, television, fashion, pop music and politics – many of the most powerful players are blonde. But there
is something strange about all these blondes. Very few of them are genuine.”
―Joanna Pittman, On Blondes

Let me say right up front, that to say that Jude is the only woman in The Crying Game does a
disservice to both Dil and Jude and falls into the critical trap of essentially linking sex to biology.
Further, since the film hinges on the “reveal” of Dil’s body surface, it would seem naïve and
rather archaic of me to simply say that the evidence of a penis on Dil’s body makes her a man.
Rather the two characters present an opportunity to examine the rupture of language and study the
relations of nomenclature to image to concept. To approach this examination I will examine the
character of Jude in relation to critical readings of Miranda Richardson’s characterization that
identify her as evil, abhorrent, scorpion, a monster. The level of animosity that has been directed
towards her portrayal as been rather torturous and for me the root of that animosity has not been
thoroughly explored. In this chapter I propose an analysis of the character that argues an
ambiguity about Jude’s gender, race and sex as a result of a transformation to her hair is the
source of animosity and hostility towards the “only” woman in the film.
As an initial point of entry, the language that has been leveled against Jude has depicted
her as a threat, a menace, a terror. Emer Rockett and Kevin Rockett argue “some feminist critics
in particular took exception to the fact that the one ‘good’ woman in the film was a man, and
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condemned the portrayal of Jude as ‘misogynistic’” (134). Further, Marina Burke has quoted
Neil Jordan as saying that he wrote Jude “quite consciously as a monster, a monstrous part,
because all the men who survive make female choices, and the woman makes males choices. It’s
very consciously done” (18). I find these sexist arguments of her character limiting and rooted in
a historical reading of women, gender and sex essentials. Their argument, both filmmaker and
critic, presupposes that a woman must be gentile, soft, a damsel, and not in possession of the
phallus. And if she is in possession of the phallus she is, as Kristen Handler argues in her reading
of the film, “the scorpion…the phallic woman, who has been more commonly described as Black
Widow, Spider-Woman, Deadlier than Male” (37). In short, Jude is the monster of the narrative.
To read Jude as monster opens up the breadth of the discussion. As Jeffrey Jerome
Cohen argues in his reading of culture through the monsters produced in that culture, “Like a
letter on the page, the monster signifies something other than itself: it is always a displacement,
always inhabits the gap between the time of upheaval that created it and the moment into which it
is received, to be born again” (4). With this in mind, Jude can, and should, be read as an image
that signifies something other than woman in the traditional sense, something other than woman
in the monstrous-feminine sense. As a monster, Jude can be read two-fold, and by moving across
the gap of her recreation or rebirth, and between her character in the first and second halves of
the narrative, a challenge to the notions of woman, gender and sex is made available. Cohen
states, “Every monster is in this way a double narrative, two living stories: one that describes how
the monster came to be and another, its testimony, detailing what cultural use the monster serves”
(13). Thus, the gap is the crux upon which the monster must be read through. Therefore what is
the gap, or more specifically, at what point in the narrative is the characterization of Jude made
monster? I contend that the moment of recreation or rebirth is the point when Jude reenters the
narrative and is seen with a drastic change in hairstyle. As I have argued earlier, haircuts and
transformations to hair is a place of splitting, a site of rupture within the narrative and is a locus in
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the formation of identity. As such, this point in the narrative is an example of the Transparent
Violent Moment in cinema. Jude’s re-entry is shocking, and produces a sense of fear that
presupposes the dead have risen, and a vampire, a zombie or some other monster has risen from
the earth and is about to wreck havoc upon the unsuspecting hero. Cohen argues that “Because of
its ontological liminality, the monster notoriously appears at times of crisis as a kind of third term
that problematizes the clash of extremes—as ‘that which questions binary thinking and introduces
a crisis’” (6).
Having risen from the ashes of the past, Jude appears as a result of crisis (exploding
greenhouse), at a time of crisis (Fergus is involved with another woman that he reads as male),
and introduces crises (Fergus suicide mission and Dil’s haircut) into the narrative. With respect to
hair, in her inquiry on the history of blond hair, Joanna Pitman states, “I was well aware that
women who try on masks and radically change their appearance often do so in response to a
crisis” (6). Thus the radical shift in Jude’s hair from blonde to red, also presents an opportunity
to question the binary dynamics of male/female, either/or. It is within the turmoil of these crises,
that the “kind of third term,” Jude as woman is able to become monster. To arrive at and utilize
Jude’s monstrosity, let me begin looking at her characterization at the start of the narrative. As
discussed previously, the Opaque Movement of The Crying Game begins with the introduction
of the first cinematic image of a person. In the film, that moment is the fair/carnival when we are
first introduced to Jody and Jude. She is a blonde woman in a denim skirt. Her hair is swept back;
the strands are loose, flowing and unkempt, yet still feminine in their styling. When read against
the other images in the sequence, Jude’s blonde hair is the blondest and the one styled in the most
feminine manner. This first backswept hairstyle shows Jude at her most feminine, ironically her
most deadly. It is here at the fair/carnival that Jude lures Jody to his capture outside the
fairgrounds. Cohen argues, “Times of carnival temporally marginalize the monstrous, but at the
same time allow it a safe realm of expression and play” (17).
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In this scene she is portrayed as an object of desire: it is while she has this hairstyle that
she utilizes the powers of femininity, beauty, sensuality, and sexuality to her fullest to lure Jody
into the IRA trap. She gives her body to the cause in order to capture the prey. Is this the first
trespass of character? As women have been traditionally symbolized as the metaphor for the
nation, is her role as lure and her willingness to do her part for the cause a betrayal to her
symbolic representation as Mother Nation?xxii So even at this point in the narrative Jude is
showing monstrous characteristics, namely, her ability to lure the soldier away from the crowd.
This ability lies in the fact that she is visually a woman as conveyed by her hair. Beyond that, she
is the white woman seducing the black man. When discussing representations of blacks in
cinema, Ed Guerrero says “the white woman as the essence of whiteness, the most prized
possession of the white man and the object of desire of all other races, is a powerful
representational current running through Western literature and cinema” (64).
I contend it isn’t simply the paleness of her skin that allows for her to be named white
woman, but the blondness of her hair. It is her blond hair that is used to depict the concept of
woman, to depict freedom, beauty, sensuality, (hetero)sexuality, and femininity. It is this
cinematic marker―the female image with blonde hair―against which every other cinematic
representation of sexuality, desire, pleasure, consumption, production, and creation is gauged
against currently. In agreement with Guerrero, Jude’s hair is meant to showcase beauty, natural
female beauty. Pitman says, “blonde hair, with its genetic allure, has become linked to femininity
and beauty” (5). She continues, “it has become a blazing signal in code, part of a value system
laden with moral, social and historical connotations that has rooted itself in the human
subconscious of the West and increasingly across the rest of the world” (Pitman 3).
The cinematic marker is evidenced in cinema by the head toss from side to side or from
top to bottom that allows the long tresses to move through space with the appearance of wanton

xxiixxii

Again, see Mosse for a discussion of the role of women in, and symbol of, nation.
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abandon. Jude displays a quick hair toss when she arrives at the greenhouse hideout on her
motorcycle. She enters the room and takes off her helmet. She shakes her hair quickly from side
to side and runs her fingers through her hair. This ability to run your fingers through hair is at the
heart of freedom. It means that he can run his fingers through your hair. It means that your hair
will fall into place. That your hair will move when you move: that you won’t have pain. For
women of ethnic ancestry who have thick hair that could be viewed as coarse, kinky, curly or
nappy, this freedom doesn’t always come easily. “’Freedom’ is still equated with having straight
hair,” say Ayana Byrd and Lori Tharps in their study of black hair (180). They continue to say
that for black women, though there are “various natural styles [that] have the freedom to swim,
sweat, and walk in the rain without destroying their styles” (180) these women don’t wear these
styles. Byrd and Tharps state that the reason these hairstyles are not represented in the media is
because “manufacturers understand that the majority of Blacks would not see freedom in wearing
natural hair. They would instead feel further alienated, ostracized, and unattractive” (180). One
could say that this alienation, ostracization or marginalization by cultural standards of beauty
might make a woman feel as if she were a monster, unwelcome in the society that created these
borders of beauty. Now this fear of becoming something monstrous, something cast out of culture
is not limited to women solely. For the mechanisms of cultural production that influence women
also influence men. The authors contend that “Even though women are often more vocal about
their desire for straight hair, Black men are a fundamental part of the equation. Since Black males
are raised in the same environments as females, it is inevitable that many of them will find
straight hair desirable for women and sometimes for themselves” (Byrd and Tharps 154). The
frightening aspect to this statement, man runs the risk of becoming a monster himself.
Of course, adhering to this notion as represented by the cinematic marker informs women
and men both who feel that straight blond hair is the epitome of beauty, of a pain-free existence.
Byrd and Tharps state “Popular culture continues to be filled with Black women with long, or at
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least soft, moving hair. Music videos overflow with light-skinned, long-haired women or,
continuing a trend that started in the early nineties, feature women who are of mixed heritage,
Asian or Latina” (180). Now it should be acknowledged that the borders of cultural production,
in this case beauty standards related to hair, apply to men and women alike; however, in terms of
monster theory, Cohen asserts, “Primarily these [cultural] borders are in place to control the
traffic in women, or more generally to establish the strictly homosocial bonds, the ties between
men that keep a patriarchal society functional” (13). Important to Cohen’s argument here in
terms of The Crying Game is the critical readings of the relationship between Jody and Fergus
that for the most part assert a firm heterosexuality to Fergus while conceding a homosocial bond
with Jody. (See Chapter 2.) To follow Cohen’s reasoning, to assume and assert a homosocial
bond between the two men in the film implicates two important issues regarding the women in the
film: 1) the women in the narrative exist at the margins established to bind the nature of woman,
and 2) the role of women within the narrative is to reaffirm the homosocial relationship between
Jody and Fergus.
As described so far, Jude, as monster, exists at the margins of society in terms of what
constitutes a ‘good’ woman. Also situated at the margins of the narrative is Dil. As we have
worked through monster theory so far, it should be apparent that Dil is also monster, and thus as
defined by Cohen, also a woman, yet let me explain her monstrosity a bit further. Like Jude, Dil
has also experienced the Transparent Violent Moment. Her identity has been re-ascribed. For
some, this new image is Jody, for others it is black man, for still others, like Handler who states
“this new identity becomes inflected, or infected, by figures of pathological femininity: the
pathetic queen, the hysterical, clingy, self-destructive woman, [who] in the place of the penis
adequate to the phallus,…displays at this point the multiple lack of her
homosexual/transgendered/feminine identity” (36). With each slash, she has been contained,
neutered, leashed, and positioned into a corner of the room from which we can gaze upon her
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without any further threat to a spectator’s identification of self. In her reading of the film, hooks
identifies Dil after the Transparent Violent Moment as a woman who “suddenly turns into the
traditional ‘little woman,’ eager to do anything for her man. She is even willing to kill. Her
aggression is conveniently targeted at the only ‘real’ woman in the film, Jude, who happens to be
white” (60). I have several problems with this assertion by hooks. First, I agree with hooks that
the traditional ‘little woman’ is eager to please, and that angers me that that image/notion is
rooted in my consciousness. However, I find it problematic that this traditional ‘little woman,’ at
least the image/notion I have occupying my mental plane, would never kill for her man. The
image of traditional woman is accompanied by connotations of demure, subdued, true selfinferiority and most definitely not a creature capable of killing. I mean the thought of violence
frightens this type of woman, that’s why she has a man to protect her from violence, from getting
carried away by those savage monsters – actual or theoretical.
Beyond this, the evocation of ‘happens to be white” situates Dil in black and not in
mixed, not in different, not in other, and it anchors Jude in white and doesn’t allow for the
possibility that Jude is also a black woman post-hair transformation. It conveniently allows hooks
to evoke and work with the binary essentials needed to make her statement ‘real’ as if the quotes
situate her from outside the essential binaries needed for her argument. In his reading of the film,
John Hill also discusses the binary essentialisms of male/female along with the concepts of
either/or, the notions of hybridity, and the violence perpetrated by the women in the film.
However, like hooks reading of Dil in the film, I find Hill’s reading of Jude’s character as mostly
negative rather problematic given the premise of his argument that he outlines as—
I began by focusing on the issue of binary analysis, the ‘either/or’ approach to the
assignation of identity. This can lead to the othering and rejection of the different
which de Beauvoir describes, or, faced with the discomfort of difference, to liberal
humanist myths of ‘sameness’ which may function to cover up and deny that real
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and important differences do exist, differences which perhaps constitute a
challenge to established norms. (Hill 90)

By criticizing Jude’s character for exercising power and challenging traditional feminine
notions Hill has succumbed to the ‘cover-up’ represented in the traditional notion of femininity
and is therefore reinforcing the very binary analysis that he is trying to resist. As this shows,
resisting identification is very problematic and challenging: it is not an easy feat to accomplish
because the writer, critic, theorist, spectator can easily become consumed by the knowledge and
material they are reading and forget that they were trying to resist this material in the first place.
Unmaking that very thing we have made in order to “rethink such ‘structures’ of difference” (Hill
91) can trap the individual who has to use those very structures of langue to deconstruct their
existence. Thus, while trying to read beyond and deconstruct the binary analysis of difference in
The Crying Game, Hill “may be seen to be falling into exactly the position that the film in its
imperfect way is warning us against” (94).
Another problematic concern is the exclusion of violence, the ‘willingness to kill,’ and
‘aggression’ being exempted from the female sex, from the ‘real’ woman in the film, and locating
it firmly in the male, in the black, in the Other. I take offense that men, to be seen as men, can
only be violent, can only be aggressive, and if they are truly frightening and violent, they must
also be black, or Other. As can be seen in their distinct readings of the women in the film, hooks
and Hill both take note of the aggression and violence associated with each character. For hooks,
Dil is not a ‘real’ woman and targets her violence towards the only woman in the film, as if she
were a ‘self-destructive woman.’ For Hill, Jude takes pleasure in her aggressiveness, which can
also be seen within hooks description of Dil. Regarding Jude, Hill says, “She is in many ways the
most wholly negatively presented character: sexually aggressive, violent when it is not necessary
to be so…apparently reveling in her role as a dangerous woman, which is presented very much as
a role she enjoys” (93). This reveling in her sexuality is also a characteristic of the monstrous, as
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Ben Barootes states in his examination of monstrosity in contemporary British fiction, “Upon
seeing La Bestia naked bare as is, the unnamed heroine recognizes a part of his animal nature
within her self. She admits this seemingly monstrous sexuality is a part of her being, embraces it,
and permits herself to revel in it. She decides to release her lamb-self and ‘run with the
tigers.’…She thus liberates her sensuality, her sexuality, her desire. Shirking passivity, she
becomes – if not aggressive – assertive” (Scott 192-193). By embracing her monstrous sexuality,
Jude as scorpion joins the ranks of women “who oversteps the boundaries of her gender role [and]
risks becoming a Scylla, Weird Sister, Lilith (‘diereste Eva,’ ‘la mere obscure’), Bertha Mason, or
Gordon” as described by Cohen (9). To this I would add Dil as the woman who oversteps her
gender role of wife by moving on sexually with Dave and Fergus. For both hooks and Hill,
implicit in their arguments are behavioral acts that challenge the traditional notions of femininity,
and would thus situate both Jude and Dil at the margins as monsters.
Lastly, I have a problem with not only hooks, but all other critics who use the quotation
marks around the ‘real’ to serve as their manner of exempting them from the binary essentialism
they assign to biological understanding of gender, sex, and race. ‘Real’ is easy; it is a quick
shorthand to say that I mean ‘biological’ or ‘authentic.’ It allows for a discussion of language
rupture to bypass the discussion. Instead it carries and indicates preference; meaning, I ‘prefer’ to
keep my biological sex contained and free of the contamination by not calling her trans-, and
allowing her entrance into woman. As for race, skin tone has been the predominate method for
determining race. Cultural behaviors or actions are rarely considered as a means of identifying an
individual within any given race, as it appears an inability to mobilize for political action is
available. I would argue that the affinity one shares with another based upon cultural practices
and behavior provides a sufficient entry point into this conceptualization. However, I will
approach questions or challenges to Jude’s racial and sexual identification as a result of her hair

82	
  

transformation in the Transparent Violent Moment. As we make our way through this discussion,
keep in mind the following two aspects of reading culture via monster theory:
A mixed category, the monster resists any classification built on
hierarchy or a merely binary opposition, demanding instead a ‘system’
allowing polyphony, mixed response (difference in sameness, repulsion
in attraction), and resistance to integration.” (Cohen 7)
And,
Any kind of alterity can be inscribed across (constructed through) the
monstrous body, but for the most part monstrous difference tends to be
cultural, political, racial, economic, sexual. (Cohen 7)

During the greenhouse sequence Jude let’s her hair down and begins to flex her muscles. She
displays overt racism and minimal compassion. She hides her body under a pile of clothes but she
still expresses herself sexually by kissing Fergus. Of all the volunteer soldiers that are part of this
IRA splinter group, Jude is the only character that is given the ability to stand up to the men
around her. She makes tea and sandwiches like the traditional role of the woman should, but she
also pokes, prods, challenges the authority of Peter. She questions the actions, motivations, and
character of the “hero.” She wields the gun as a weapon to inflict pain upon Jody. She is the only
character in this Ireland sequence that has a voice and is able to use the gun as a weapon and not
just as a symbol of strength. Therefore, if the pistol is also symbolically the phallus, she is the
only white character in the first half of the film to wield its power. This must make her an
abomination, a monster, an aberration to femininity. Clearly it is Jude’s assault against the
borders of traditional feminine notions and the established order of patriarchy that makes her the
aggressive scorpion. Sarah Edge says in her reading of the film, “Jude can be seen to represent
such a danger in a number of complex ways. First, she does so through her nationalism and
feminism, represented through her rejection of traditional ‘feminine’ signifiers, and her threat as a
disruption to the patriarchal symbolic order” (181).
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Her emergence from the makeover moment is not that different than either of her Irish
representations or as drastic as Fergus’ transformation – at first blush. When we meet Jude in
London she is “the image of the femme fatale, the phallic woman” (Handler 37). She is cold. She
is calculating. She is methodical. She dresses more sophisticated. She shows her body with her
clothes. She embraces her sexuality. She embraces her femininity. She stands up directly to
Fergus who attempts to exert control over her by grabbing her hair and threatening her to stay
away from Dil. She has no compunction about sacrificing Dil for the cause. She dominates
Fergus. She dominates and controls Peter and now appears to be in charge of the operation. And,
she loses the phallus when Peter reaches between her legs and grabs the gun. It is as if he
disconnects the phallus from the body, castrating her. Of course he can’t wield its power either
seeing as he is gunned down in the street.

Figure 9: Still image of
Jude arranging herself
before the mirror after the
Transparent Violent
Moment

After her emergence from the Transparent Violent Moment, Jude’s hair is colored red and cut
into a severe bob with a wig-like appearance. By changing the color to red, she is “taking all the
old qualities” associated with red hair and “reclaiming them. [She] is saying red hair stands for
liveliness (not mischief), originality (not non-conformity), determination (not stubbornness),
passion (not tempter) inventiveness (not dangerous) and a decided (not dangerous) strength of
character” (McCracken 105). The hairstyle is smooth and contained, there are no fly away
strands. Every aspect of her hair and her identity is firmly under her control. Her gazing at herself
in the mirror to smooth out her red hair is her conscious attempt at creating an image of herself
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that reflects her interiority – “Aye, I was sick of being a blond. Needed a tougher look, if you
know what I mean” (Jordan 239). As Marion Roach states in her study of red heads:
Under the circumstances, I would have been less shocked if he had said,
‘You may be many things, you redhead, but you are no lady.”…This is
because I define myself in part by my color. And I know it is the proverbial
slippery slope: That there are associations with red hair I utterly reject and
others I wear proudly means nothing to anyone else, since I don’t get to
choose how the observer sorts those same traits. Grazing through the
stereotypes, I am on the delicatessen plan, winding a way over the menu
offerings, picking, choosing and rejecting; adhering to some, dismissing
others. Having adopted a method of personal vigilance that allows me to be
on the lookout for associations that suffuse my color with preferred
associations and to reject those I choose not to adopt, I enhance my selfimage. But to other people my red hair is more a take-it-or-leave-it
experience: Red-haired, to them, I may also be a certain type of person,
complete with temperament. (Roach 193)

This fact of her character is what frightens men and women about her character. She is in control.
She has decided to extricate herself from the cinematic marker of beauty and make a new
representation for herself. This process of making her new identity as an equally beautiful image
destroys and deconstructs the cinematic marker that is traditionally ingrained in the mind of the
spectator. Her perceived violation of the cinematic markers symbolic characteristics is what
angers the spectator. Through fire, Jude kills the cinematic marker and is reborn in a new
cinematic representation that is similar in appearance to the gendered representation of the
chanteuse in the Metro bar. The fact that the image of beauty is now associated with gendered and
sexually ambiguous characters from the Metro bar troubles the spectator who will not resist the
power of the cinematic marker: the spectator who will not resist the power of essentialism.
Now, if we rupture the language of ‘no lady,’ ‘color’ and ‘red’ we can cross the borders
and boundaries between gender and race as a link between Jude and Jody. This is because,
beyond the style of hair that mimics a black ‘transvestite,’ there is the red color of Jude’s hair and
it’s evocation of blood. Along with blood, there is the fact that both Jude and Jody are mutilated,
their bodies ripped apart by a tank or riddled with bullets. Barbara Creed states in her study of the
monstrous feminine, “the horror film offers many images of a general nature which suggest
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dismemberment. Victims rarely die cleanly or quickly. Rather, victims die agonizing messy
deaths – flesh is cut, bodies violated, limbs torn asunder” (107).

a.

b.

Figure 10: Still images of the violent and brutal deaths of Jody (a) by the tank and Jude (b) by
gunfire. Jody and Jude share not only messy deaths, through language and blood the two characters
exist at the margins of society as monsters, as similar.

The images above illustrate how their presence in the film moves from a familiar body to that of
corpse, bloody and unrecognizable. Creed states, “The ultimate in abjection is the corpse. The
body protects itself from bodily wastes such as shit, blood, urine and pus by ejecting these things
from the body just as it expels food that, for whatever reason, the subject finds loathsome. The
body ejects these substances, at the same time extricating itself from them and from the place
where they fall, so that it might continue to live” (9). In the case of Jude and Jody, living is
constituted as a ghost that permeates the entire narrative. Jody’s death and Jude’s ‘first’ death
occur nearly simultaneously at the end of the greenhouse sequence. Unlike Jude, Jody reenters the
narrative sooner in the forms of dreams, photographs, and a haunted presence that hangs over the
relationship of Dil and Fergus as if he were a ghost. Jude’s reentry to the narrative is assumed to
be tangible, living, as if more than a zombie or some other imagined monster; however, her
relationship to Fergus will continue to haunt his actions as well.
A distinction between the two characters, Jude and Jody, is the absence of substance. The
mass of Jody’s body is absent from the images after he is killed; his body exists in a space outside
the narrative even though he is viewed within the film. He is a black man, a possibly queer man,
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moving within and apart from the world created within the film. He is remade or called into
existence through clothing and hairstyle. While he cannot be seen in the physical sense, he affects
the narrative via a haunting of the characters. On the other hand, Jude returns from this abject
space of existence with material form. Her presence, her body is recognized and seen by those
around her. Though she haunts the world around her, she is not seen as a monster, only identified
by monstrous characteristics.
If we look at Jude and Jody as representations of male and female objects, in that each
represents the current image of societal or cultural conception of gender, sex and race, can we not
question their subjectivity given that each is ‘dead,’ a ghostly representation of something that
was once alive but no longer. Creed states, “the subject, constructed in/through language, through
a desire for meaning, is also spoken by the abject, the place of meaninglessness – thus, the subject
is constantly beset abjection which fascinates desire but which must be repelled for fear of selfannihilation” (10). If both Jude and Jody, as ghosts, inhabit this abject place of meaninglessness,
is their presence or work in the narrative assumed to be over given that neither really exists?
However, once Jude returns to the narrative she shares an affinity for a short bob, she no longer
haunts Fergus like Jody, she physically makes him act, whereas Jody made him act
subconsciously. As stated before, Jude’s characterization is deemed, aggressive, vile, monstrous;
in short, contemptible. The language used to describe her character situates her in a position that
mimics Jody in that in the first half of the film, Jude considers the body of Jody as animal, beast,
monster, contemptible. Again, through language, the two are then situated within the same space,
but what of the body. If the hairstyle between the black ‘transvestite’ and Jude as monster does
not enable us to cross the border which separates those who take up their proper gender roles
from those who do not that Creed has found within horror films, there is always the blood.
Kristeva says, “But blood, as a vital element, also refers to women, fertility, and the
assurance of fecundation. It thus becomes a fascinating semantic crossroads, the propitious place

87	
  

for abjection” (59). It is through the blood of Jody and Jude and their appearance within the
narrative as symbols of vaginal or menstrual blood that a more bodily link can be made. In the
images below, the hooded Jody represents “a graphic image of the vagina dentata. The visual
association between biting and bloodied lips, sexual intercourse and death…” (Creed 75), while
the image of thinly veiled curtains punctured by the bullets that kill Jude represent a hymen being
penetrated.

a.

b.
Figure 11: Still images from The Crying Game. a. Jody after being hit in the face by Jude has the
hood removed to reveal a bloody mouth that symbolically represents the vagina dentate. b.
Punctured curtain by a bullet symbolically represents a torn hymen. Each image precedes the messy
deaths of Jody and Jude. Through language and blood the two characters exist at the margins of
society as monsters, as similar.

Therefore, in possession of the vagina dentata, Jody has entered the realm of the monstrous
feminine and the monstrous in that the spectator is aware of a hybrid body in dual possession of
the penis and the vagina dentata; and, by associating the thinly veiled curtains as an external
representation of Jude’s hymen, it would appear that I am making her female, however, the
curtains are external to her body, and so I am ascribing the material or symbolic conception of sex
onto a body that may or may not be female. Of course to accept this assessment that Jude and
Jody are similar, is to recognize a monster that is not a “monster of prohibition…that cannot-must
not” (Cohen 13) cross the border, but is in fact a monster of opposition or permission that in fact
must cross the border in order to cross Cohen’s threshold of becoming and manifest itself. To
recognize this is to see that Jude, Jody and Dil, as monsters, as men, as women, “…they are
disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in any
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systematic structuration. And so the monster is dangerous, a form suspended between forms that
threatens to smash distinctions” (6).
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Dil — Something New in The Crying Game
Chapter 4
Hair is a key aspect of appearance, one that is always on view unless it is purposely concealed, removed, or lost as a
result of aging or disease….Throughout history, men’s and women’s hair styles often have been quite different, and
both have varied with the changing fashions. Certain styles have been regarded as “feminine” while others were viewed
as “masculine,” which set the genders apart and enabled people to identify one another more easily. For thousands of
years, in most cultures, women wore their hair longer than men’s….In modern times, as in the past, hair continues to
serve a psychological role in most people’s lives and it provides a means of revealing cultural and social values. People
use their hair for self-expression as well as a vehicle for gaining social acceptance.
—Victoria Sherrow, Encyclopedia of Hair: A Cultural History

If you let it, the ghost can lead you toward what has been missing, which is sometimes everything.
—Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination

The genres in which one could classify The Crying Game are varied: romance, drama, action,
horror, political, or thriller. I would also argue that one could read the film as if it were a ghost
story – a haunting narrative full of complex characters that hang over the narrative as if they were
specters from the past and the future. Generally, ghosts can be described as transparent
apparitions in whose absence a presence is felt or experienced. I choose the term transparent
consciously as a descriptive term for apparition, for by definitionxxiii , it is a term that could be a
synonym for ghost. Further, within this complex definition is a not only a characteristic that could
be termed ghostly, but a term that recalls traditional photographic film or film stock that has been
processed – transparency. The complexity of this term and its ability to drag multiple concepts

xxiii

According to dictionary.com, transparent is defined as follows: 1. having the property of transmitting rays of light through its
substance so that bodies situated beyond or behind can be distinctly seen. 2. admitting the passage of light through interstices.
3. so sheer as to permit light to pass through; diaphanous. 4. easily seen through, recognized, or detected: transparent excuses.
5. manifest; obvious: a story with a transparent plot. 6. open; frank; candid: the man's transparent earnestness.
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within its word, recalls for me the character of Dil, in whose cinematic image a complexity of
concepts can be located or defined. Is Dil a ghost in the traditional sense of an apparition that
represents the soul or spirit of a deceased person? I would argue no and yes; and by doing so, I
would contend that Dil as a character, through narrative characterization and in portrayal by Jaye
Davidson, is an image that could represent Avery F. Gordon’s theoretical concept of complex
personhood that she defines as the following:
Complex personhood means that all people (albeit in specific forms
whose specificity is sometimes everything) remember and forget, are
beset by contradiction, and recognize and misrecognize themselves and
others. Complex personhood means that people suffer graciously and
selfishly too, get stuck in the symptoms of their troubles, and also
transform themselves. Complex personhood means that even those called
“Other” are never never that. Complex personhood means that the stories
people tell about themselves, about their troubles, about their social
worlds, and about their society’s problems are entangled and weave
between what is immediately available as a story and what their
imaginations are reaching toward. Complex personhood means that
people get tired and some are just plain lazy. Complex personhood means
that groups of people will act together, that they will vehemently disagree
with and sometimes harm each other, and that they will do both at the
same time and expect the rest of us to figure it out for ourselves,
intervening and withdrawing as the situation requires. Complex
personhood means that even those who haunt our dominant institutions
and their systems of value are haunted too by things they sometimes have
names for and sometimes do not. At the very least, complex personhood
is about conferring the respect on others that comes from presuming that
life and people’s lives are simultaneously straightforward and full of
enormously subtle meaning. (Gordon 4-5)

As complex a definition of this concept that Gordon posits, it is my goal in this chapter to explain
that Dil as character and image represents not only this conceptualization, but is an image that
also represents something new, something that nobody recognizes. The complexity of this
argument will manifest itself through a discussion of Dil within the Transparent Moderate
Moment, the Transparent Violent Moment, and the importance of her hair throughout the Opaque
Movement of the narrative. As noted in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, hair is
important in the identification process, especially if one is to try and identify gender and sex by
extension. It is through hairstyles that identifications of self and other are recognized and
misrecognized by characters in, and spectators of, The Crying Game. As I see it, being that hair is
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the most malleable aspect of one’s identity the modification to the character’s hair serves as the
most convenient method for transmission and realignment or shifting of one’s gender, sex, or
race. Now, while a haircut indicates a rupture in the ability to name a character’s identifications
has occurred, there is also the need to recognize that a haircut can indicate a realignment in the
character’s identity is also present. The choice to utilize the word realignment rather than simply
shifting, though shifting is implicitly a component of the haircut, is important in this discussion of
Dil because realignment implies that there is an initial, or original, referent upon which the
haircut is trying to return the body. Within The Crying Game, this realignment is seen by
spectators who recognize the character of Dil post-haircut as black man or similar to Jody. To
read Dil’s character as black man is to read the cricket whites and the short afro as belonging to
an original character that is named Jody in his cricket whites and black man in possession of a
penis in absentia. Reading the character of Dil as such is to retain an attachment to a photograph
and a dream-image representation even though a name is only implicitly given to the photograph
by the individual captured by the photograph. This is to say that consuming the two images
(photograph and dream-image of a body in motion) is to acknowledge that the two images are
real and can serve as the referent upon which to name and identify Dil. In accepting or admitting
these images as real, the spectator is validating Gordon’s reading that hauntings are more than
childhood repressions or merely “reality-testing” as Freud advocates in his study of the uncanny.
For Gordon, Freud did not challenge the presence or power of the ghost as he studied the
uncanny; rather, she argues that by following the ghost, recognizing that the ghost is present and
in fact acts upon reality, one is able to identify or name that which is missing from reality. So
what is it that is missing in The Crying Game? What is missing from the spectator’s canon of
consumed referents that a misrecognition of a body in motion is made readily and apparently?
And if one were to state that they don’t believe in ghosts, how is it that the two different images
of a man known to be dead serves as a referent for a character who says of herself, “Don’t
recognize myself, Jimmy.”?
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The importance of this line in the naming process is central to understanding how people
choose to ignore the complexity of Dil’s personhood and instead choose to disregard her voice in
the identification process and instead transfer power to the dead when it implicitly named itself in
the photograph. Understanding the power of ghosts and haunting is to agree with Gordon when
she states: “The willingness to follow ghosts, neither to memorialize nor to slay, but to follow
where they lead, in the present, head turned backwards and forwards at the same time. To be
haunted in the name of a will to heal is to allow the ghost to help you imagine what was lost that
never even existed, really” (57). The ghost in this case is Jody, and the ‘thing’ that was lost or
never even existed was Jody in his cricket whites. To move backwards and forwards through the
narrative of the movie is to understand the distracting characteristics of hauntings like the
aforementioned presence of the uncanny, repetitions, transference, and the desire to see the shape
of Dil in the image of Jody. As Gordon states, “I look for her shape and his hand; this is a
massive project, very treacherous, very fragile. This is a project in which haunting and phantoms
play a central part. This project where finding the shape described by her absence captures
perfectly the paradox of tracking through time and across all those forces that which makes its
mark by being there and not there at the same time” (6). Thus for spectators who identify Dil in
cricket whites as similar to Jody in cricket whites is to see her shape, her identity, in his body.
Though Dil is seen in a similar outfit, the body of the Jody-image in the same outfit does not
occupy the same space, nor does it move through space with the same movement. To find Dil in
his body, is to find her shape by ignoring her presences and absences, and privileging the
visibility of his body in his hand.
To understand haunting is to give a certain visibility to the invisibility of Jody in the
second half of the narrative, or more specifically a hypervisibility to the character. Gordon
defines hypervisibility as such, “Hypervisibility is a kind of obscenity of accuracy that abolishes
the distinctions between ‘permission and prohibition, presence and absence.’ No shadows, no
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ghosts. In a culture seemingly ruled by technologies of hypervisibility, we are led to believe not
only that everything can be seen, but also that everything is available and accessible for our
consumption” (16). The power of this hypervisibility that is granted to Jody prohibits the
presence of Dil as a representation of something else; it disregards the voice of Dil in the naming
process, and it ignores the power of the ghost’s effects on reality.
The confluence of these three statements occur simultaneously after Dil has had her
haircut during the Transparent Violent Moment and during the sequence in which the spectator
and Fergus are first introduced to the photographic images of Dil and Jody in his cricket whites.

Figure 12: Still images from The Crying Game. a. Photograph of Jody in his cricket whites, b. First
introduction of Dil and representation of the photographic space that Jody and Dil only occupy
together, c. The scissors used as a weapon in psychological warfare by Fergus during the
Transparent Violent Moment of Dil.

CLOSE ON THE WALLET. Credit cards, army
identification photograph.
JODY: Inside. There’s a picture.
Fergus takes out a picture. It is of Jody, in cricket
whites, smiling, holding a bat. Fergus smiles.
JODY: No, not that one. There’s another.

a.

Fergus takes out another picture of Jody and of a
beautiful black woman, smiling.
JODY: Now she’s my type.
FERGUS: She’d be anyone’s type.

DIL: Go on, then.
Fergus begins to cut.

b.

CLOSE-UP ON DIL’S FACE as her hair is shorn.
Tears stream down her cheeks.
DIL: You’re no good at this, Jimmy.
FERGUS: I’m sorry.
But he keeps cutting. He gives Dil a short, cropped
military cut like Jody’s.
DIL: You want to make me look like him…
FERGUS: No. Want to make you into something
new. That nobody recognizes…

c.

She looks in the mirror at it in the dark.
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The three statements overlap and collapse the narrative as the power of the past makes itself felt
on the present and the future. Figure 12 above will serve as the mechanism through which we can
collapse the narrative and recognize the importance of the repeated presence of viewing Jody in
his cricket whites throughout the Opaque Movement in both photographic stasis and filmic
movement in the misrecognition of Dil, post-haircut.
Up until the moment of the first scene above, the Opaque Movement of the narrative,
which began at the carnival at the beginning of the movie, has posited images of white actors with
blond or brown hair and Jody with his dark complexion and short afro. The photograph of Jody in
his cricket whites that he dismisses but Fergus smiles at, introduces a second image of an
individual with dark complexion and a short afro. There is no voice associated with this image.
The like-for-like resemblance between Jody and the image of Jody in his cricket whites is
combined with the implicit understanding that the two images are indeed one via an absent
acknowledgement of “no, that is me.” This second image of another type of person of color is the
introduction of Dil via photographic image. The introduction of Dil is the first disruption of our
identification with the narrative. Her presence suddenly disrupts our ability to name. Until this
moment, we haven’t seen any hair like this on the screen, and so we ignore the hair and implicate
the skin and simply say ignorantly, black, or more intelligently – mixed race. Our ignorance is
arrived at by the deflection of the lighting, the luminosity of which whitewashes the hue of Dil’s
skin into a gradation of white to taupe to brown and the shades in-between. Since her skin
provides a complication for the spectator, her hair is subconsciously deferred to in order to name.
It is her hair, with its volume, it massy material occupation of the space before us that kinks the
image projected from inside her representation into a shadow above white, non-white, mixed,
black.
However, like the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, the voluminous mass of her
hair is what enables the spectator to recognize and misrecognize her as gendered and sexed
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female. It is through her hairstyle and its’ juxtaposition against Jody in the second figure, and
throughout the narrative pre-haircut, that Dil is read as female. The meaning of her hair is
complicated with the reveal of the body in possession of the penis, however at that point in the
narrative she is implicitly identified as either transvestite or possibly male-to-female transgender
by Fergus or the spectator. Regardless, in either case, misrecognition has occurred as Dil has
neither voiced her identity as transvestite nor transgendered. The presence of a penis on the
surface of her body is simply, “Details baby, details.” More than that, the presence of the penis on
the body of a woman gives material representation to Luce Irigaray’s ideaxxiv that “woman has sex
organs more or less everywhere. She finds pleasure almost anywhere. Even if we refrain from
invoking the hystericization of her entire body, the geography of her pleasure is far more
diversified, more multiple in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly
imagined—in an imaginary rather too narrowly focused on sameness” (Conboy, Medina, and
Stanbury 252-253). If that doesn’t affirm her femaleness, maybe the focus on situating her in a
sameness with Jody illustrates that for spectators who choose to name and identify her as similar
to Jody are seeing the use-value in her character, and thus reducing her to a commodity, an
artifact, in their identification process.
Despite this, until the moment of her haircut, the ability to name or identify Dil is
complicated for the spectator who feels cheated, abused, manhandled, and violated in his previous
identification of Dil as ‘straightforward’ female. The complex feelings that the reveal has
produced within the spectator could mimic the complex feelings of Fergus as shown in the scenes
below:
FERGUS: No. Can’t pretend that much.
DIL: I miss you, Jimmy.
FERGUS: Should have stayed a girl.
DIL: Don’t be cruel.

xxiv

See Chapter 1 for more of a discussion of Dil as a representative of Luce Irigaray’s theoretical concept of woman as
argued in This Sex Which Is Not One.
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FERGUS: Okay. Be a good girl and go inside

And
COL: When a girl runs out like that, she generally wants to be followed.
FERGUS: She’s not a girl, Col.
COL: Whatever you say.
But Fergus rises and walks out.

At the heart of this complexity is the fact that the reveal of a penis on the surface of a woman’s
body challenges the culturally produced notions of what constitutes female, biologically. The
apparent disconnect between the long hair and the penis on the body troubles the expectations of
the narrative and the spectator that are associated with an image that is meant to represent the
love interest of the film. This is of significant importance if, as I have argued in an earlier chapter,
Fergus got his second haircut during the Transparent Moderate Moment in order to shift his
sexuality from something-other-than-heterosexual into a heterosexual position in order to be with
Dil. The sense of betrayal inherent in the disconnect between body and hair length illustrates the
importance of hair to convey cultural meaning and the need and desire to punish that which
causes discomfort, challenges cultural borders, or inflicts pain in its brazenness.
The importance of the cultural meaning associated with hair length and gender, though I
admittedly acknowledge women can indeed wear short hair, can not be overstated. As Sherrow
indicated at the top of this chapter, “People use their hair for self-expression as well as a vehicle
for gaining social acceptance” (xxv) and in the case of Dil, her hair is meant to express her
femininity. In addition to Sherrow and Kobena Mercer, Janice Miller concurs with the ability to
imbue hair with cultural meaning when she states, “Like many other customs concerned with the
manipulation and fashioning of the human body, hairstyling and management is part of a range of
culturally sanctioned practices and meanings associated with the communication of facets of
identity, including status, taste, sexuality and gender” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 184). These
‘culturally sanctioned practices and meanings” can be read as hairstyles and their imbued cultural
meaning as a representations of man, woman, transvestite, transgender, or ‘artifacts of
civilization’ (imagination’s object) as defined by Elaine Scarry throughout her work The Body in
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Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, while the ‘facets of identity’ can represent the
concepts or ‘objectless fear’ (race, gender, sex, sexuality) that are imagined and invented to
alleviate pain. The importance of this last statement will become apparent, but for now, let me
return to the complication Dil has generated and the need to alleviate the pain that her complex
image has produced.
Miller argues in her examination of disembodied hair that through culturally-imbued hair
and hairstyles, “Society then monitors its inhabitants in relations to this normality, subjecting
transgressions, and those committing them, to ridicule and to its margins. Thus there is pressure
to fulfill ideals of bodily presentation as functioning and aware members of that society. Hair is
an integral part of this social and cultural body” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 184). In light of this,
it stands to reason that those bodies that are forced to the margins through ridicule (for
transformations to their hairxxv) approach the border space of the monster as defined by Jeffrey
Jerome Cohen in his conceptualization of monster theory. These members of society and culture
that exist at the border as monster, patrol and monitor society and ensure that normalcy or
preconceived notions of culture and cultural production are maintained by the majority, else, they
to become monsters banished to the fringe of culture. As I argued previously in Chapter 3,
reading Dil, like Jude, as a monster within a culture that defines the body through an essentialist
eye, requires that the monster be punished, ridiculed, and slayed in order to return normalcy to
culture; that is, alleviate the pain that the monster (objectless fear) generated through its
transgression against straightforward, culturally-defined normalcy.
The complexity in Dil’s personhood, the disconnect between body and hair length, and
the uncomfortable distraction within society recognized in having to witness or acknowledge the
margins of culture as seen within the two aforementioned statements returns us to the ghostly

xxv

Though Dil has yet to undergo the Transparent Violent Moment at this point in the discussion, the transformation to her hair can
be read as punishment to a body in possession of a hairstyle that offends, betrays, or transgresses the accepted cultural-defined norms,
namely what constitutes a woman or is meant by female, at any given point in time.
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haunting of the narrative. We return to Gordon through language – man, woman, transgender,
intersex, heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, transvestite – and concept – race, gender, sex,
sexuality, other, monster – as they haunt the dominant institutions of culture, to acknowledge that
the discomfort, anxiety, and pain that they generated in garnering the respect of culture initially
can be conferred onto the image and representation of Dil currently. Yet to approach the truth of
this closer, we must go back further to acknowledge the hypervisibility of Jody as the dominant
mode in which we attempt to see the shape of Dil in the image of Jody. To begin, Figure 12 is
representative of the photographic space that Jody and Dil occupy within the narrative. In this

, the two characters occupy the same frame, however a line down
the middle operates twofold: 1) as a means of visually distinguishing between characters – man
and woman, and 2) a visual representation of the borders of culture and the existence of the
monster at the margin of society. Given that Figure 12 represents a point in the narrative in which
Jody and Dil occupy the same photographic space, and the accompanying dialogue which
indicates “she’d be anybody’s type” adds to the complexity of the situation in that this sequence
in the narrative is able to operate twofold: 1) Dil and Jody are separate individuals within the
same space (photographic and film) and narrative – man and woman, and 2) spectators and
Fergus can collapse the distance between man and woman into a singular image that collapses the
distance between the three images – photographic image of Jody in his cricket whites, Jody as a
character representing black man with a penis in absentia, and photographic image of Jody and
Dil together – into the single image of Dil in Jody’s cricket whites post-haircut, or image of a
black man in cricket whites with penis presently in absentia.
Beyond these two possibilities existing with the line and the possibilities existing within
the sequence, the line can also represent other possibilities that approach the possibilities of the

99	
  

sequence: the line can represent the gap between two frames of a film that have been edited
together; the line can represent the space between the spectator and the film; the line can
represent the in-betweenness, or more specifically the site at which, the combination of three
factors: “First: to exist is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its look or
locus….Second: the very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and desire, is a
space of splitting….Finally, the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given
identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy – it is always the production of an image of identity and
the transformation of the subject in assuming that image” (Bhabha 63-64) in the process of
identification, or more specifically identity formation, as theorized by Homi Bhabha occurs; less
complexly, the line can simply represent the point through which the haircut of Dil allows the
spectator to return to the narrative in order to misrecognize her as male, black man in similarity to
Jody.
At this point it seems prudent to acknowledge that the line could represent a cut in the
frame, as if it were a wound that requires suturing for closure; and, by acknowledging the cut and
the wounding that occurs with the cutting, it seems prudent to acknowledge what has been
referred to up to this point in the chapter as a given and yet should be cut open, explored and
interrogated further, the haircut of Dil during the Transparent Violent Moment. The importance
of the haircut should be apparent to the discussion so far in terms of how the misrecognition of
Dil is obtained, however, to approach it further let us return to the importance of hair in cultural
production and of what import haircutting has to society. Miller contends, “The frequency with
which hair is cut, shaped and cleaned and the decisions that surround these seemingly everyday
occurrences, are part of a range of bodily practices of self-management and discipline” (BiddlePerry and Cheang 184). So for Dil to maintain the long, massy and voluminous tendrils of curly
hair in a feminine manner is to practice self-management and discipline in her subconscious
performance of the female gender as argued by Judith Butler in her work Gender Trouble.

100	
  

Further, as I noted earlier, the disconnect between Dil’s body and hair length produced an
uncomfortable sense of anxiety for spectators who may or may not have consumed image
representations like Dil before: Dil’s body spoke to an essentially biological male while her hair
spoke to a woman performing female. The cultural management and discipline of Dil occurs at
the time of the haircut and the subsequent maning of her by spectators as male; though, I should
note, even within the film the maning of the character post-haircut is complex in that Dil refers to
herself in the third person, as if the name and body did not go together: Fergus refers to Dil as
Dil, Dil refers to herself in the third person, and Jude refers to Dil as ‘that thing,’ ‘it,’ and ‘sick
bitch.’ However, for spectators to name her as Jody is to recall an affinity for Jody, an image with
a short afro that they can refer to. The blink and you miss it presence of another black character
with a short, almost bald, head of hair, occurs within the Metro bar and only serves to disrupt the
recognition process, and thus, I would argue is ‘spit out’ as if it were never seen. The lack of
repetition of that singular image does not allow for continuous consumption like the repeated
image of Jody in his cricket whites both in photographic format and filmic movement consumed
throughout the Opaque Movement. This repetition of image is a characteristic of hauntings that
Gordon refers to and illustrates the power of the ghost to act upon reality. While the ghost is
acting upon reality in the haircutting process, it is the resulting image of Dil with a short afro that
recalls Jody. Miller argues, “Disembodied hair again suggests a sympathetic connection with its
previous host, and a supernatural power lying within its own compounds. Hair was part of ritual
and sacrifice, being offered in return for the protection of the self or loved ones…” (Biddle-Perry
and Cheang 189). Located within her statement is a complexity of relevance to the haircut at the
time of the Transparent Violent Moment and the resulting naming that occurs.
To begin, once cut away from her body, the hair becomes disembodied from Dil’s body
and thus there is a sympathetic connection to the previous host (Dil), however ‘a supernatural
power lying within its compounds’ allows for a resulting hairstyle that has a sympathetic
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connection to a previous host – Jody with a short afro. Miller states that “Hair is dead and always
has been, yet once it is removed from the body it seems to have an eerie ability to survive beyond
us, sinister, because the dead nature of hair is masked by so many cultural representations of it. It
is on many occasions a ghostly reminder of the absent body from which it originates.” (BiddlePerry and Cheang 184) In the case of Dil, the cutting away of hair from the body does not allow
the hair – and the feminine conceits associated with the length – to survive, rather it falls to the
floor and stays dead. The cultural representations associated with the short afro dominate the hair
that remains on the body. The short afro becomes the ghostly link to the absent Jody who
originated the hairstyle within the narrative. As such, the presence of a short afro on Dil’s body
and subsequent dressing in cricket whites concludes the repetition of seeing “Jody” in cricket
whites in that Dil now represents a material representation of some image or concept that was
never seen within the narrative. See, seeing, and seen are complicated in that they mean different
things to my argument. As a spectator we see the movie before us, and in the process of watching
the movie, we are seeing the image of Jody in his cricket whites, however we have not seen Jody
in his cricket whites. What we as spectators have seen is a photograph of the character in those
clothes with that hairstyle. What we as spectators have seen is a dream-like representation of said
photographic-image in motion within the subconscious of Fergus, which thus implies that Fergus
has imagined the photographic-image in motion and it is therefore not real. If we are to say that
the photographic-image in motion is real, we are acknowledging Gordon’s ‘reality-testing’ as
valid and therefore acknowledge hauntings as real and therefore the image we are seeing is a
ghost haunting Fergus and the narrative and is therefore real. In acknowledging the reality of Jody
the ghost, we must understand Gordon’s assertion that “it is also true that ghosts are never
innocent: the unhallowed dead of the modern project drag in the pathos of their loss and the
violence of the force that made them, their sheets and chains” (22) as a component to the
motivation behind the cut.
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To state that the ghost of Jody was an active component or participant in the making of
Dil into the material representation of his former existence is to acknowledge violence directed
towards a fellow marginalized being. To state this recalls a statement I made in Chapter 1 that
challenged David Marriott’s non-reading of the black spectator deriving pleasure at the
destruction of the black body in his work On Black Men, and a statement I made earlier that
indicated the frame showing Dil and Jody occupying the same space is a visual representation of
the borders of culture and the existence of the monster at the margin of society. To this I say,
reading culture from a position of monster or ghost is to begin assuming a marginalized position
in which one sees the possibilities that members of society are never never straightforward, or
never never complex; rather, it assumes a position that acknowledges that members of the same
groups of people (race, gender, sex, sexual orientation) will act together, that they will vehemently
disagree with and sometimes harm each other, and that they will do both at the same time and
expect the rest of us to figure it out for ourselves, intervening and withdrawing as the situation
requires. The movement between, within and apart from this argument is to recognize that if we
acknowledge Jody as a real ghost, as the original referent for what Dil post-haircut is to represent
and be identified as, we must acknowledge that he contributed to the violent act of cutting Dil’s
hair; and in that making, he derived pleasure in the destruction of the black body and it is
evidenced by the grin he displays in the scene post-reveal which occurs outside of Fergus’s
dream mind.
Now, to return to the complexity of relevance located within Miller’s earlier statement
about the ritual sacrifice surrounding the haircut is to recall an earlier argument that I made in
Chapters 1 and 2, in which the motivation for Fergus to cut the hair of Dil in the Transparent
Violent Moment was part of ritual and sacrifice, being offered in return for the protection of the
self or loved ones, namely Fergus’s avoidance of a suicidal mission. Once the gravity of his
suicide mission occurs to him he states that he doesn’t have a choice, except Jude points out.
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“Och, you do, Fergie.” “Of course. I forgot.” Life or death Fergus that is your choice she
indicates. However Fergus hears that Jude has offered up the other woman in the narrative as a
sacrificial lamb.
As such, let us begin looking at the cutting of Dil’s hair within the Transparent Violent
Moment as an act of sacrifice in the preservation of the self, loved ones, and the borders of
cultural normalcy. Miller argues that “To leave the body, to be cut off, to fall out, to be separate is
for hair to reveal its marginality; to become alienated from its ‘natural’ bodily context and hence
become menacing” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 185). The natural bodily context that is being cut
away from Dil’s body and offered as a sacrifice to whoxxvi are her femininity and her femaleness
located symbolically within her hair length. To affirm this, Miller states, “…and most significant
here…the magnitude of her hair loss is emphasized visually…representing the degradation of her
feminine identity, sexuality and life force” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 190). Though Miller was
making this argument about Oiwa in the story Yotsuya Kaidan, in my application of the argument
to the character of Dil, I would disagree with the degradation of her sexuality or life force in that
specifically, Fergus and Dil enjoy the ‘honeymoon suite’ and Dil is a force to be reckoned with
when she ties Fergus to the bed and proceeds to kill Jude.
Further, Miller argues that “when hair traverses the boundaries of the body by leaving it,
by being cut or pulled out…its nature, its meaning and symbolism and any cultural understanding
of it undergoes an unsteadying shift. On the body, hair is controlled, familiar and homely: it [my
emphasis] is part of us. Off the body, it transforms itself into something at the same time alien,
unfamiliar and unhomely” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 185). On her body, the hair is controlled by
a familiar cultural understanding that often reads long hair as belonging to the feminine, however
once the hair is removed a new, controlled, familiar symbol takes the place of the long hair, the
xxvi

By discussing the haircut of Dil as an act of ritual or sacrifice is to recall Elaine Scarry’s discussion of who, namely
God, and the role of wounding the body in the making of the world comprised of artifacts of civilization and the
subsequent repeated production of wounding the body in making that which called for the ritual act of sacrifice in the
first place, namely God.
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short afro, which is often associated with black men. This statement acknowledges that hair
undergoes a cultural shift stated by Sherrow and thus acknowledges the political cultural-beauty
associations of the afro in 1970s America that belonged to women and men alike. Yet, within the
context of The Crying Game and the Opaque Movement, it is in the removal of the hair from the
body that it is transformed into something alien, unfamiliar and unhomely, namely the short afro.
This is because after Dil has her haircut during the Transparent Violent Moment, the short afro
serves as the ghostly link to Jody in his cricket whites as argued earlier. Miller concurs when she
says, “It [short afro] has thus become this absent body’s [Jody] symbolic presence—its ghost—a
reminder of the transient nature of the human body, and an emphatic assertion of hair’s ability to
both represent and exceed it” (Biddle-Perry and Cheang 186).
The it under discussion now is the concepts associated with Dil in cricket whites. The
image of Dil in cricket whites exists within the narrative for only a short period of time. During
its manifestation the words used to define and name it move between Dil as uttered by Fergus, Dil
as uttered by Dil, and ‘that thing,’ ‘it,’ and ‘sick bitch’ as uttered by Jude. Clearly there is no
agreed upon words upon which to call the image. The movement between words that each drag
concepts of ‘girl,’ ‘wife,’ ‘wee black chick,’ ‘not a girl,’ and ‘man,’ shows the instability of
cultural concepts and moves the image to the margins occupied by the Other, the monster, the
ghost, the ‘something new, something that nobody recognizes’ for language is incapable of
defining its conceptualization. In saying that, I am aligning the conceptualization of what the
image of Dil in cricket whites represents along the spectrum of pain and imaging closer to
Scarry’s definition of pain in that she describes the cultural sameness of any one language’s
inflexibility to express pain because “the utter rigidity of pain itself: its resistance to language is
not simply one of its incidental or accidental attributes but is essential to what it is” (5).
So what does that mean to begin approaching the conceptualization of this image?
Defining her as man, woman, transgender, intersex, woman with a penis, heterosexual,
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homosexual, lesbian, transvestite, hybrid, other, monster, or ghost only approaches her
identification, her identity. Reading her character, her image, as ‘something new, something that
nobody recognizes’ sees and understands that the image is going to prove unstable in its
complexity. To recognize this image is to see that the image, in its making drags in the pathos of
their loss and the violence of the force that made them, their sheets and chains into its existence
and interaction with the world around it. In its making is the destruction, the unmaking of other
creations, other facets of identity that can be called man, woman, transgender, intersex, woman
with a penis, heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, transvestite, hybrid, other, monster, or ghost. In
its making is the destruction of the force that made it: Jody the ghost and Fergus’s ritual sacrifice.
In its making is the consent to be made. In its making there is warfare, there is torture. In its
making is violence. In that violence: destruction, cutting, pain, wounding, unmaking.
To see this violence is to see the role of the scissors in the process of identification within
both the Transparent Moderate Moment and the Transparent Violent Moment. To see the role of
the scissors is to understand and see the scissors as a physical object that moves between both
weapon and tool during the two haircuts seen on-screen. To elaborate, Scarry states, “The weapon
and the tool seem at moments indistinguishable, for they may each reside in a single physical
object (even the clenched fist of a human hand may be either a weapon or a tool), and may be
quickly transformed back and forth, now into the one, now into the other. At the same time,
however, a gulf of meaning, intention, connotation, and tone separates them” (173). Scarry goes
on to distinguish the difference between weapon and tool as result of the surface upon which the
artifact (hammer, ax, knife, scissors) acts. The surface in question for Scarry is a matter of
sentience versus nonsentient surfaces. For now, I will maintain that the surface upon which the
weapon and tool are acting upon is a surface with no substantiation – that is characters projected
onto a screen. By not discussing in depth Scarry’s conceptualization of the weapon and tool
distinction here, I concede that I agree with Scarry’s physical distinction between weapon and
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tool; yet, by talking about cinematic artifacts (scissors, razors, knifes, blades, shavers, etc.)
utilized in the haircutting process the movement between weapon and tool is going to be situated
within Scarry’s argument that it is the gulf of meaning, intention, connotation, and tone separates
them.
In both the Transparent Moderate Moment and the Transparent Violent Moment, the
cinematic artifacts (scissors) are present in the making process. During the TMM, the scissors are
utilized as a tool by Dil to cut the hair of Fergus. The intention and meaning for Dil is to trim his
hair as part of her professional duties as hairdresser, stylist. As I argued in Chapter 2, the
intention and meaning for Fergus to trim his hair may be his desire to perform heterosexuality,
and thus there is an apparent distinction or gulf in meaning associated with the action of the
scissors in the haircutting process. In the TMM, there is no sense of warfare in that Fergus has
entered the salon and asked to have his haircut; Dil consents to cut his hair as part of her
profession. While there is no warfare, there is a sense of torture, self-torture, or self-alteration in
that Fergus, as a ‘generic embodied imaginer’, has a desire to create, to produce, to make an
artifact that represents conceptually a heterosexual male. This desire is to materialize an imagined
object (heterosexuality) that he believes will alleviate the pain generated from not having had
sexual relations with Jody. Within the Transparent Moderate Moment, the scissors are viewed in
close-up as they snip and clip away the hair. For Dil and Fergus both, the scissors are but a tool in
the haircutting process. Of course, this changes once the scene is repeated during the Transparent
Violent Moment of Dil that occurs within the same space, with the same cinematic artifact
(scissors). During the Transparent Violent Moment, the scissors become a weapon in the
transformation process. The movement of the scissors from tool to weapon is evidenced by the
scene in which Dil and Fergus engage in psychological warfare. In the TVM, consent is obtained
as can be seen in Figure 12 at the beginning of this chapter – “Go on, then.” The sigh, the
resignation that is conveyed within the line when uttered during the movie, conveys the sense of
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loss and pain felt by Dil after waging war with Fergus. In the course of their battle Fergus
employs psychological tactics such as “You’d do anything for me?”, “You said anything.”, “Want
to change you…”, “No.”, and “I promise.” While Dil counters during their exchange with “No
way-“, “A girl has to draw the line somewhere.”, “You’d like me better that way, Jimmy?”, “And
you wouldn’t leave me?”, “You promise.”, and finally, concession with “Go on, then.” Of course
what is missing from this, and cannot be located on the page of the script (absence of body and
movement), is the use of the scissors during the discussion. Dil is seated in the chair, and Fergus
is standing above and behind her. In his hand the scissors hang above her, and within the
artifact’s contents is the threat of violence, the threat of cutting, the threat of wounding, the threat
of inflicting pain upon the body in order to illicit the desired imagined object (Jody in cricket
whites). Beyond the threat of violence, wounding and pain, is the missing component of the
discussion that can not be written with sufficient accuracy in that it must be seen. The scene
between Dil and Fergus must be viewed, must be witnessed in motion in order to see the process
of identity formation as it occurs. What must be seen is the pain experienced as a result of a
haircut; pain that can only be seen in the tears that flow down the cheeks of Dil as her hair is
clipped and snipped away. To see the tears is to understand Scarry’s articulation which states
“Physical pain is not only itself resistant to language but also actively destroys language,
deconstructing it into the pre-language of cries and groans. To hear those cries is to witness the
shattering of language. Conversely, to be present when the person in pain rediscovers speech and
so regains his powers of self-objectification is almost to be present at the birth, or rebirth, of
language” (172). And so, what must be seen, consumed and incorporated visually is the blades of
the scissors as they snip, sever, bite, eliminate the hair that contained within it the artifacts of
civilization (woman, woman with a penis, transvestite, transgender, homosexual, female,
femininity) and the making of a new imagined object with a hairstyle that contains different
artifacts of civilization (man, penis, homosexual, heterosexual) all of which represent different
facets of identity that currently convey culturally-defined norms. To see the Transparent Violent
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Moment is to see the destruction of an artifact (character with a pre-established identity) and
witness the birth of a new artifact (character with an as-yet-unnamed identity). To see the
Transparent Violent Moment or the Transparent Moderate Moment is to hear the person selfidentify themselves. To see the Transparent Violent Moment of Dil is to hear an image that is
unable to self-objectify or to assume a pre-given identity; rather, to see Dil in cricket whites after
the Transparent Violent Moment is to see something new, something that nobody recognizes.
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